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The Final Battle For Preemption:
The FDA and Prescription Drug Labeling Product Liability Actions
BY MARY J. DAVIS
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has promulgated a new regulation which
revises the format for prescription drug labeling, and, in the process, has taken the position that
the regulation displaces, or preempts, state products liability laws that seek to assess liability on
the manufacturer for a label’s warning adequacy. In the FDA’s 100 year history, it has not taken
the position that federal prescription drug labeling regulations preempt common law tort claims
until the last few years, beginning with Motus v. Pfizer in 2002. This position, radical to many
and rational to others, places federal preemption of prescription drug labeling actions directly in
the center of the debate over the proper roles of federal regulation and state tort laws in effecting
product safety. The Supreme Court has added to that debate with a number of product liability
preemption decisions in the past two decades. Seeking to promote both understanding and
balance regarding the operation of preemption doctrine within products liability, this Article
provides a comprehensive explanation of the applicability of preemption doctrine to prescription
drug product liability actions. This Article explores the history of preemption doctrine
specifically as it relates to the food and drug laws, evaluates the importance of the FDA’s
position on the application of that doctrine to current litigation, and provides direction to courts
seeking to navigate the battlefield of federal preemption.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal preemption of common law tort actions has become the subject of conspiracy
theorists, dedicated tort reformers, and all those in between. Described on the one hand as a
“massive effort at the federal level to chip away at state tort law,”1 and, on the other, “a good
thing instead of standards set by . . . state juries,”2 advocates on both sides of the preemption
debate have an opinion about whether, and, if so, how, federal regulations should defeat state
common law tort actions.3 The Supreme Court has addressed preemption doctrine a number of
times in the last fifteen years since Cipollone v. The Liggett Group, Inc.4 put federal preemption
of product liability actions on the map. The political dimension of this issue has been widely
explored,5 but this Article does not enter that debate. Rather, this Article provides insight into
the important doctrinal battle the issue represents, one fairly described as the final battle in
federal preemption. This “final” battle is over whether federal prescription drug labeling
regulations impliedly preempt state common law product liability actions. The Supreme Court
has addressed express preemption on a number of occasions since Cipollone6 but most express
preemption provisions either do not clearly outline their scope and, therefore, implied preemption
*Stites & Harbison Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A. University of Virginia, 1979;
J.D. Wake Forest University School of Law, 1985. I would like to thank the participants at the Randall-Park
Colloquium Speakers Series, University of Kentucky College of Law, for their observations on this subject. Thanks
especially to Professors Richard Ausness, Louise Graham, Jim O’Reilly, and David Owen for their helpful insights,
and to Tammy Howard, University of Kentucky College of Law, Class of 2006, for her fine research assistance.
1 Ralph Lindeman, Agencies Move to Override State Law as Part of Federal Rulemaking Process, 34 Prod. Saf. &
Liab. Rptr. (BNA) at 364 (April 10, 2006) (quoting Susan Frederick, with the National Conference of State
Legislatures); id.at 364 (federal agency statements favoring preemption are “sneak attack on consumer rights,”. See
also Margaret Clune, Stealth Tort Reform: How the Bush Administration’s Aggressive Use of the Preemption
Doctrine Hurts Consumers, Center for Progressive Regulation White Paper #403, at 2 - 4 (Oct. 2004). (describing
new FDA position on preemption as “anti-consumer tort reform agenda”).
2 Id. at 364 (quoting David Price, with the Washington Legal Foundation, a conservative legal reform group).
3 For a discussion of the general debate on preemption by agency action, see Catherine Sharkey, Preemption by
Preamble: DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2006); and Catherine Sharkey and Samuel Issacharoff, Backdoor
Federalism, UCLA L. Rev.
4 Cipollone v. The Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)(involving express preemption of product liability actions
by federal cigarette labeling laws).
5 Compare Margaret H. Clune, Stealth Tort Reform: How the Bush Administration’s Aggressive Use of the
Preemption Doctrine Hurts Consumers, Center for Progressive Regulation White Paper (October 2004); News
Release, WLF Hails FDA Policy Statement on Preemption of Failure-to-Warn Suits, Washington Legal Foundation
(January 25, 2006).
6 See infra notes and accompanying text (discussing express preemption cases since 1992).
must operate,7 or no express preemption provision is contained in the relevant legislation, as is
the case with the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.8 Consequently, the final unanswered
preemption question remains: When are common law tort actions impliedly preempted based on
actual conflict with federal agency regulations?
The prescription drug labeling cases and the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s)9
new position in favor of implied conflict preemption squarely raise the issue. Historically,
federally approved prescription drug labeling has not been considered preemptive on the question
of the label’s adequacy under tort law because federal regulations in this field set a minimum
standard of care rather than an optimal one and, therefore, more exacting state tort law standards
of care do not conflict but operate concurrently with the federal requirements.10 The Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution,11 which defines federal law as supreme, does not prevent the
operation of state laws in this instance. The FDA has promulgated a regulation which revises the
7 See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Corp., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (preemption regarding requirement for
driver’s side air bags found based on implied preemption doctrine).
821 U.S.C. §§ 301 et. seq. (2000) (establishing federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938). See Caraker v.
Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1031 (S. D. Ill. 2001)(portion of FDA dealing with pharmaceuticals
does not contain preemption provision); McCallister v. Purdue Pharms L.P., 164 F. Supp. 2d 783 (S.D. W. Va. 2001)
(same); Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 2002 WL 181972 at * 2 (S. D. Ind. Jan. 28, 2002) (same). See also, James T.
O’Reilly, A State of Extinction: Does Food and Drug Administration Approval of a Prescription Drug Label
Extinguish State Claims for Inadequate Warning?, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J 287, 290 (2003) (no express preemption
provision in prescription drug labeling sections of FDCA); David R. Geiger & Mark D. Rosen, Rationalizing Product
Liability for Prescription Drugs: Implied Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to Uniform
Pharmaceutical Safety Standards, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 400 (1996) (same).
921 U.S.C. § 393 (2000)(authorizes the creation of the Food and Drug Administration as the agency responsible for
administering the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
10Witczak v. Pfizer, 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 730 (D. Minn. 2005); Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Oxendine, 649 A.2d 825,
828 (D.C. 1994); Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1989); Wells v. Ortho Pharm Corp., 788 F.2d
741, 746 (11th Cir. 1986). See also DAVID G. OWEN, M. STUART MADDEN, AND MARY J. DAVIS, MADDEN AND
OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 28:6, at 910 (3d. ed. 2000). In general, an applicable regulatory standard is often
considered relevant, but not conclusive, to a finding of negligence. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 373, at p. 1033 (2000); DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 14.3, at p. 888 (2005). The basic
premise of this principle is that regulators, whether legislators or agency administrators, intend only to set minimum
standards of care applicable to specific settings that will necessarily be revisited with time. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 16 cmt b (Proposed Final Draft)(May 17, 2005)(lawmaking
process “insufficiently attentive” to interests of injured); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4(b) (1998). For a general discussion of the doctrine as
applied to products liability actions, see Symposium, Regulatory Compliance as a Defense to Products Liability, 88
GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000); Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a “Strong” Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L.
REV. 2120 (1996); Teresa Moran Schwarz, Regulatory Standards and Products Liability: Striking the Right Balance
Between the Two, 30 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 431 (1997); Teresa Moran Schwarz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations
in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121 (1988).
11 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“The Constitution, and laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land, . . . ).
requirements for prescription drug labeling, and, in the process, is taking the position that the
regulation preempts state products liability laws that seek to assess liability on the manufacturer
for a label’s warning adequacy.12 In the FDA’s 100 year history, it has not taken the position that
federal regulations preempt common law tort claims based on prescription drug labeling until
now.13
This Article explains the applicability of preemption doctrine to prescription drug product
liability actions, explores the importance of the change in FDA position on that doctrine, and
provides direction to courts asked to resolve the battle over the boundaries of federal preemption
in this critical area. Section II of the Article sets the factual stage for the FDA preemption battle.
Section III defines the regulatory scheme under the FDCA in more detail to place the preemption
issue in context. It also explains the FDA’s new regulation on prescription drug labeling and
how it is being used to support preemption. Section IV describes general preemption doctrine and
gives a detailed treatment of that doctrine in the area of food and drug regulation. Section V
analyzes critically the basis for implied conflict preemption under the FDCA and evaluates those
arguments in a manner consistent with a deeper understanding of the Court’s preemption
doctrine. Section V addressed the effect of the FDA’s change in position on the preemptive
effect of its regulations. Agency position on preemption has been given some level of deference
in the Supreme Court’s modern preemption jurisprudence.14 The amount of deference to give an
agency’s determination of preemptive scope has generated much debate, both within the Court15
and among commentators.16 The Supreme Court has not answered the question of how agency
position affects the operation of implied conflict preemption doctrine nor how the historic
primacy of state regulation in the area of health and safety is to be considered in the balance.
Section VI concludes that implied conflict preemption of prescription drug labeling
actions is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s modern preemption jurisprudence. The
historical and detailed treatment provided by this Article leads to the conclusion that the Supreme
1271 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934-3936 (Jan. 24, 2006). The prescription drug labeling regulation became final and
effective on June 30, 2006. Id. at 3928.
13For a discussion of the history of the FDA’s position on preemption based on prescription drug labeling, see infra
notes and accompanying text.
14See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (discussion of deference to FDA’s preemption position
regarding medical device regulations).
15 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)(Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer, and Justice O’Connor
disagreeing about level of deference to give to FDA preemption interpretation).
16 See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, “After You, My Dear Alphonse!”: Should the Courts Defer to the FDA’s New
Interpretation of § 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments?, 80 TULANE L. REV. 727, 767-775 (2006); Allison
Zieve and Brian Wolfman, The FDA’s Argument for Eradicating State Tort Law: Why It Is Wrong and Warrants No
Deference, 34 Prod. Saf. & Liab. Rptr. (BNA) 308 (March 27, 2006). See generally Paul McGreal, Some Rice With
Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 823 (1995); Nina
Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004).
Court’s preemption jurisprudence does not permit an agency’s position to alter the historic
balance between federal safety regulation and common law tort principles when that position has
been consistent and longstanding even though modern events, and political positions, may cause
the agency to retreat from it. Traditional tort law continues to play an important role in providing
compensation for injured consumers and the Supreme Court’s preemption doctrine requires
much more than agency change of heart to alter that conclusion. The boundary between state tort
law and federal regulation of prescription drug labeling continues to be well-marked, preserving
the traditional place for the operation of state tort law.
II. SETTING THE STAGE FOR PREEMPTION: MOTUS V. PFIZER17 AND
THE NEW DRUG LABELING REGULATION
In late 2002, the FDA filed an amicus curiae brief in Motus v. Pfizer, Inc.,18 in which it
asserted that a warning label it had approved for the anti-depressant drug Zoloft preempted the
plaintiff’s product liability action based on the inadequacy of the label’s warning of the risk of
suicide, from which the plaintiff had died.19 Before Motus, the FDA’s position had been that
“FDA product approval and state tort liability usually operate independently, each providing a
significant, yet distinct, layer of consumer protection.”20 An FDA official has explained the more
aggressive recent stance in favor of preemption: “Our willingness to invoke implied preemption
17 Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004)(affirming summary judgment on causation and not reaching
preemption issue).
18Amicus Curiae Brief of United States, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004)(filed September 10,
2002), available at 2002 WL 32303084 (hereafter Motus Amicus Brief of United States).
19Motus, 358 F.3d at 660. Zoloft is in a category of anti-depressants known as selective seratonin re-uptake
inhibitors, or SSRIs. See Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1088 (C. D. Cal. 2000) (background
information on Zoloft), rev’d on other grounds, 358 F. 3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004).
20Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 57 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 7 (1997). Ms.
Porter was FDA chief counsel at the time of the article. See also, James T. O’Reilly, A State of Extinction: Does
Food and Drug Administration Approval of a Prescription Drug Label Extinguish State Claims for Inadequate
Warning?, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J 287, 287 (2003) (“Until DHHS [Department of Health & Human Services] asserted
prescription drug preemption in [Motus], FDA had remained aloof from preemption arguments that often had been
made by prescription drug manufacturers in defense of individual products liability lawsuits.”). A few months before
the Motus brief, the FDA took a similar preemption position in another products liability action which was ultimately
decided on other grounds. See Bernhardt v. Pfizer, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16963 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2002).
At the time of the United States’ Motus Amicus Brief, the FDA’s General Counsel and architect of the
changed preemption position, Daniel Troy, had formerly represented Pfizer, Inc. during his time in private practice.
Gary Young, FDA Strategy Would Pre-empt Tort Suits: Does it Close Off Vital Drug Data?, THE NATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL, vol 26, at p. ___, col 1. (March 1, 2004). Troy has been criticized for not disclosing his Pfizer ties. House
Cuts OC’s Funds for Downplaying Troy’s Drug Industry Ties, FDA Week, § 29 (July 16, 2004). See also O’Reilly,
supra, at 287 (discussing FDA change in position regarding preemption); Clune, supra note at 2-4 (describing FDA
change in position under Troy).
can be traced to the growing propensity of bad scientific reasoning to seep into court cases
involving FDA-regulated products.”21 The FDA and prescription drug manufacturers take the
litigation position that approved prescription drug labeling preempts state tort claims based on
alleged inadequacies in the labeling.22 According to opponents of the FDA position, traditional
tort doctrine, through operation of the civil justice system, “establishes a duty of care that
protects citizens when the federal government is too slow to act or when federal standards are
insufficient.”23
In Motus, plaintiff alleged that the warnings on the anti-depressant Zoloft were
inadequate under state product liability laws because they did not emphasize sufficiently the
association between use of the drug and an increased risk of suicide.24 Prior to and during the
course of approving Zoloft in 1991, the FDA explored the potential associations between the use
21Mary Ellen Egan, Tort Turf, FORBES, vol. 173, issue 9, at 48 (April 26, 2004). See also Lindeman, supra note 1 at
365 (“State courts and juries often lack the information, expertise, and staff that the federal agencies rely upon in
performing their scientific, risk-based calculation,” says White House Office of Management and Budget
spokesman.).
Interestingly, after an ensuing three years of debate regarding whether to strengthen the warning of suicide
risk in the labeling of Zoloft and similar anti-depressants, the FDA ultimate required manufacturers to place a
stronger warning, known as a “black box” warning, on the labeling, highlighting the potential association between
the drugs and the risk of suicide. FDA Public Health Advisory, Worsening Depression and Suicidality in Patients
Being Treated With Antidepressant (March 22, 2004)(recommending labeling for anti-depressants like Zoloft be
modified to reflect potential suicide risks); FDA Press Release, FDA Launches a Multi-Pronged Strategy to
Strengthen Safeguards for Children Treated With Antidepressant Medications (October 14, 2004) (black box warning
required on SSRI’s). The British equivalent of the FDA recommended a similar warning as early as 2002, before the
FDA’s preemption position was made known in the amicus brief filed in Motus. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Public
Citizen, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (filed April 21, 2003, available at 2003 WL 22716063).
One commentator has suggested that “[m]aybe those juries aren’t so ignorant after all?” Egan, supra note at .
22Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2006 WL 1443357 (E. D. Pa. 2006) (summary judgment granted on
FDA’s implied preemption of plaintiff’s warning claims regarding anti-depressant Paxil and risk of suicide); Jackson
v. Pfizer, Inc., __ F. Supp. 2d __ , 2006 WL 1506886 (D. Neb. 2006) (summary judgment denied on implied
preemption grounds in Zoloft case); Laisure-Radke v. Par Pharm., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (W.D. Wash. 2006)
(summary judgment denied based on implied preemption in anti-depressant fluoxetine case); Peters v. Astrazeneca,
LP, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (W.D. Wis. 2006) (no implied preemption in Prilosec warning case); McNellis v. Pfizer,
Inc., 2005 WL 3752269 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2005) (no implied preemption in Zoloft case); Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377
F. Supp.2d 726 (D. Minn. 2005)(summary judgment denied based on preemption argument in Zoloft case); Dusek v.
Pfizer, Inc., 2004 WL 2191804, at * 1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2004)(not reported in F. Supp. 2d) (summary judgment
granted for manufacturer based on conflict preemption in Zoloft case); Needleman v. Pfizer, Inc., 2004 WL 1773697,
at *2 (N. D. Tex., August 06, 2004)(not reported in F. Supp. 2d)(same). See also Clune, supra note at 2-3.
23 Letter to Secretary Mike Leavitt, Department of Health and Human Services, re: Food and Drug Administration
Final Rule on the Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biologics,
from National Conference of State Legislatures, dated January 13, 2006.
24Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 127 F. Supp.2d 1085, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2001)(denial of summary judgment on issue of
preemption), rev’d on other grounds, 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004). The District Court’s opinion contains a lengthy
discussion of the regulatory history of Zoloft and other SSRIs.
of SSRI’s and suicide that had been raised regarding other SSRI’s, particularly Prozac.25 Those
concerns caused the FDA to convene a committee of experts, the Psycho-pharmacological Drugs
Advisory Committee (“PDAC”)26 to consider the issue. In 1991, the PDAC unanimously found
that “[o]n the question whether ‘there is credible evidence to support a conclusion the
antidepressant drugs cause the emergence and/or intensification of suicidality and/or other
violent behaviors,’” there was no such evidence.27 The FDA subsequently made suggestions to
Pfizer regarding warning language it should incorporate in Zoloft labeling, asking Pfizer to
“[p]lease use proposed text verbatim,” which it did.28
Pfizer moved for summary judgment in Motus on the basis of implied conflict
preemption.29 The trial court denied the motion finding that the federal regulation which permits
a manufacturer to alter a warning without prior FDA approval defeated any conflict with state
product liability laws.30 The trial court was persuaded also by the FDA Commissioner’s
statement that favored the role of unilateral manufacturer labeling changes to increase
information provided to health care providers and enhance public safety.31 In addition, the trial
court noted that while the FDA concluded that no labeling change was required based on its
review of the scientific evidence, the “FDA never stated that it would be impermissible to
include additional warnings.”32
25127 F.Supp.2d at 1090.
26Id. at 1088, 1090.
27Id. at 1090. During the PDAC proceedings, the Director of the Division stated a concern that an unintended side
effect of modifying the labeling to raise an increased concern over suicidality “might be a reduction in the use of
antidepressants in the treatment of depression, and that the result might cause overall injury to the public health.” Id.
28Id. at 1088. Plaintiff contended that Pfizer drafted the ultimately approved labeling language, not the FDA. Id.
29Id. at 1093. Pfizer also argued for implied conflict preemption based on the impossibility of being able to comply
with both the federal and state requirements. Id. at 1092.
30Id. at 1094 (referring to 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)).
31Id. at 1094. The FDA Commissioner had stated, in support of the then current regulation:
The commissioner also advises that these labeling requirements do not prohibit a manufacturer . . .
from warning health care professionals whenever possibly harmful adverse effects associated with
the use of the drug are discovered. The addition to labeling . . . of additional warnings . . . is not
prohibited by these regulations . . . In the case of an approved NDA, 314.8(d) [now
§314.70(c)(2)(i)] permits the addition to the drug's labeling . . . of information about a hazard
without advance approval by the FDA.
Id. at 1094 (citing 21 Fed. Reg. 37447 (1979)).
32127 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
In support of Pfizer’s appeal of the denial of summary judgment, the United States argued
that while FDA regulations permit a drug’s manufacturer to alter or strengthen a warning,
“ultimately, however, FDA, not each state court system applying its own standards, must approve
the warning.”33 The United States disagreed with the suggestion that to constitute an actual
conflict for preemption the FDA must reject a proposed warning change formally because “all
imaginable warnings that could reasonably have been read as describing or alluding to [the
association with suicidality] would have been false or misleading for lack of scientific support
and therefore in conflict with federal law.”34 The brief concludes that any state common law
damages action that resulted in requiring an unapproved warning would have misbranded the
drug per se, thereby subjecting the manufacturer to penalties under the FDCA.35 As a number of
courts have recognized, the FDA must make a determination that a drug is misbranded and then
seek injunctive relief from the federal district court before a final determination on the issue is
reached and penalties ensue.36 The manufacturer is entitled to a jury trial on the issue.37
The trial court in Motus denied summary judgment on preemption. 38 The trial court
reasoned that the FDA sets minimum standards and the regulatory scheme does not prohibit
manufacturers from unilaterally strengthening approved labeling.39 Though the preemption
argument in Motus was not successful, an increasing number of prescription drug labeling cases
have been defended successfully on preemption grounds.40 The cases which reject preemption
do so based on the traditional grounds relied upon in Motus.41
33Motus Amicus Brief of United States, supra note at 13.
34Id. at 14.
35Id. at 16-17.
3621 U.S.C. § 332 (2004). See also Amicus Brief of Public Citizen, supra note at 16 (filed April 21, 2003) (threat of
enforcement action not enough to create a conflict; filing of enforcement does not guarantee that the FDA will
prevail).
3721 U.S.C. § 332(b) (2004)(jury trial available on issue regarding injunctions, criminal penalties, and seizures).
38 Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1091 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
39 Id. at 1095.
40Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2006 WL 1443357 (E. D. Pa. May 25, 2006) (Paxil warning
litigation); Needleman v. Pfizer, Inc., 2004 WL 1773697 (N. D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2004) (Zoloft warning litigation);
Dusek v. Pfizer, Inc., 2004 WL 2191804 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2004)(Zoloft warning litigation). For a state case also
finding preemption, see Abramowitz v. Cephalon, Inc., 2006 WL 560639 (N. J. Super March 3, 2006)(Actiq warning
litigation).
41Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2006 WL 1506886 (D. Neb., May 31, 2006)(Zoloft warning
litigation); Laisure-Radke v. Par Pharms., Inc., 2006 WL 901657 (W. D. Wash., March 29, 2006)(Prozac warning
litigation); Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 732 (D. Minn. 2005)(Zoloft warning litigation); Peters v.
Astrazeneca, LP, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (W. D. Wis. 2006) (Prilosec warning litigation); Caraker v. Sandoz Pharms.
Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (S. D. Ill. 2001) (Parlodel lactation suppressant warning litigation). For a state case also
The FDA’s position on preemption, taken in amicus brief form in Motus, formally
appeared in its revised prescription drug labeling regulation, published in January 2006 and
effective June 30, 2006.42 The FDA first published the proposed new labeling regulation in
December 2000.43 The changes to the regulation were intended to make prescription drug
labeling clearer, more concise, and accessible for the health care practitioner audience.44 The
proposed rule did not address, nor seek comments on, its possible preemptive effect on products
liability actions.45 The proposed rule’s commentary specifically stated that it did not preempt
state law and that, therefore, it did not implicate federalism concerns.46 In the final regulation,
however, the FDA takes the position, in the introductory commentary known as the preamble,
that approved prescription drug labeling does preempt conflicting state product liability laws.47
Immediately upon the heels of publication of the final rule, Pfizer asked a federal district judge to
vacate an earlier order denying summary judgment on preemption grounds based on the new
FDA preemption position,48 and trial courts in other cases are increasingly being asked to do the
same.49
III. PHARMACEUTICAL LABELING REGULATIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL FOOD
AND DRUG LAWS
If state tort laws provided that compliance with a governmental regulation was conclusive
on the tort standard of care, there would be no need for a preemption defense because the tort
finding no preemption, see Coutu v. Tracy, 2006 WL 1314261 (R. I Super. May 11, 2006) (Propofol coma-inducing
drug warning litigation).
4271 Fed. Reg. 3922 (January 24, 2006).
4365 Fed. Reg. 81082 (December 22, 2000).
4471 Fed. Reg. at 3922.
45FDA Revises Labeling Format for Drugs, 34 Prod. Saf. & Liab. Rptr. (BNA) p. 52, 53 (January 23, 2006).
4665 Fed. Reg. at 81103 (labeling rule does not have federalism implications nor does it preempt state law;
preemption assessment required by Exec. Ord. No. 13132).
4771 Fed. Reg. at 3934. The preemption discussion appears in the introductory background, or preamble, and
comments section of the final rule without having been subject to public comment. 34 Prod. Saf. & Liab. Rptr.
(BNA) at 53.
For criticism of the FDA’s attempt to introduce the new preemption position in this manner, see Letter to
Secretary Mike Leavitt, DHHS, from National Conference of State Legislatures, dated Jan. 13, 2006, noting in
particular that See id. Letter available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2006/060113Leavitt.html.
48McNellis v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 WL 3752269 (No. 05-1286, D. N. J January 30, 2006); see also 34 Prod. Saf. &
Liab. Rptr. (BNA) at 220 (March 6, 2006) (discussing Pfizer’s motion to reconsider).
49See, e.g., Colacicco v. Pfizer, Inc., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2006 WL 1443357 (E. D. Pa. May 25, 2006); Jackson v.
Pfizer, Inc., ___ F. Supp. 2d __, 2006 WL 1506886 (D. Neb. May 31, 2006).
laws would rely on the governmental regulations to establish, or defeat, liability.50 It continues to
be the “unusual situation,” however, when a court will rule that compliance with a regulatory
standard is conclusive of a tort standard of care.51 The classic reason for this is that
governmental regulations are based on narrowly defined goals, often with limited information,
which do not include setting optimal standards of care for all circumstances; rather, they set
minimum standards not intended to prevent the operation of other remedial mechanisms such as
common law tort claims.52
Federal preemption doctrine, on the other hand, acts like a “super” government
compliance defense because it relies on the constitutionally mandated supremacy of federal law
to displace entirely a contrary underlying tort claim.53 To establish preemption, congressional
intent to preempt, which is the “ultimate touchstone” of preemption analysis, must be
discerned.54 Courts search for that intent to preempt through interpretation of an express
preemption provision55 or through the application of implied preemption principles.56
50In fact, critics of the tort system have encouraged state legislatures to make such a change, and some have. See e.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2946(5) (1995)(immunity on drug manufacturers based on federal regulatory
compliance); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403 (1) (2005) (regulatory compliance presumes due care); IND. CODE § 34-
20-5-1 (1998)(same); KY REV. STAT.§ 411.310 (1978)(same). See generally OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
supra note 1 at § 14.3 at p. 894 (“About a dozen states have enacted products liability reform statutes concerning the
effect of a manufacturer’s compliance with a governmental safety standard.”).
On the subject of regulatory compliance generally, see David R. Geiger & Mark D. Rosen, Rationalizing
Product Liability for Prescription Drugs: Implied Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to Uniform
Pharmaceutical Safety Standards, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 395 (1996)(“Fairness as well as public policy demand
that compliance with the comprehensive federal regulation of prescription drugs be conclusive evidence that
pharmaceutical manufacturers have discharged their duty to provide the public with reasonably safe and effective
products and appropriate warnings.”); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 334-35 (1985) (“Regulatory agencies are equipped to make the
risk comparisons on which all progressive transformation of the risk environment must be based. The courts are
simply not qualified to second-guess such decisions; when they choose to do so they routinely make regressive risk
choices.”)
51RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS; LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, § 16 cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft, May 17,
2005).
52 See DOBBS, supra note 10, § 224, at 573 (“When it comes to technological standards, they are quickly outdated
with no guarantee that the legislature or regulators will have time or information necessary to update them. Beyond
that, many statutes are written in response to lobbying efforts of the industry they purport to regulate, and they are
not likely to represent a balanced attempt by neutral parties to achieve appropriate safety.”); MADDEN AND OWEN ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 16:3, at 134.
53See, e.g., Cipollone v. The Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)(tobacco companies raise preemption defense
regarding warnings on cigarette packaging; limited preemption found based on express preemption provision); Geier
v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)(automobile manufacturer raises preemption defense regarding
requirement for driver’s side air bags; preemption found based on implied preemption doctrines).
54Cipollone v. The Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992)(“the intent of Congress is the ‘ultimate touchstone’
of preemption analysis,” citing Malone v. White Motor Co., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)). See also Mary J. Davis, On
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not have a general express preemption
provision,57 nor one specifically applicable to prescription drug labeling, though Congress has
written preemption provisions into the food and drug laws for specific contexts.58 Implied
preemption doctrine, therefore, necessarily will apply to the prescription drug labeling cases.
Implied preemption is recognized in limited categories of cases: (1) when the broad sweep of the
federal statute’s scope suggests a total occupation of the regulatory field;59 or (2) when
inconsistent state regulation conflicts with a federal regulation so that (a) it is either impossible to
comply with the federal mandate or (b) compliance with the state law would frustrate the
objectives behind Congress’ legislation.60 The Supreme Court has rarely concluded that federal
regulations comprehensively occupy a field to displace all state law so the narrower implied
conflict preemption doctrine is more typically applicable.61
Preemption, Congressional Intent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 181, 198 (2004)(hereafter Davis, On
Preemption) (discussing basic preemption doctrine); Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal
Safety Statutes: Supreme Court Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 Ky. L. J. 913, 917-919 (2003-2004) (same).
55Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
56Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1974)(discussing implied preemption principles). See also
Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 971 (2002) (explaining
history of preemption doctrine)(hereafter Davis, Unmasking the Presumption). See also, Davis, On Preemption,
supra note at 200-202 (2004)(discussing implied preemption doctrine).
57See supra note . See, e.g., Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 2002 WL 181972 at * 2 (S. D. Ind. Jan. 28,
2002)(portion of FDA dealing with pharmaceuticals does not contain preemption provision).
58See, e.g., Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(2006) (preemption provision regarding
medical device regulations); 21 U.S.C. § 379r (2006) (national uniformity for nonprescription drugs)(enacted 1997),
and 21 U.S.C. § 379s (2006)(preemption for labeling or packaging of cosmetics)(enacted 1997). Both of these latter
preemption provisions also contain a clause which saves the operation of product liability laws and states: “Nothing
in this section shall be construed to modify or otherwise affect any action or the liability of any person under the
product liability law of any State.” 21 U.S.C. § 379r(e); 21 U.S.C. § 379s(e).
59Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714-716 (1985) (discussing occupation of field
implied preemption requirements).
60Id. at 712-13 (discussing implied conflict preemption doctrines generally); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230-231 (1947) (same). See generally, Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note at 969-971, 990-97;
Ausness, supra note at 919.
61 Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714-716 (1985) (discussing occupation of field
implied preemption requirements; not applicable to FDA blood plasma collection requirements). See also
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988)(federal Natural Gas Act occupied field governing financing
activities of natural gas companies). Furthermore, the impossibility preemption doctrine is inapplicable to tort law
because tort defendants can always pay damages and comply with regulations at the same time. See Ausness, supra
note at 924.
Implied conflict preemption doctrine requires an assessment of the scope of the federal
law in issue and its objectives to determine whether there exists an actual conflict with the
operation of applicable state laws. Historically, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that
Congress would entirely defeat the operation of state tort laws that traditionally had operated
concurrently with federal regulation without clearly saying so.62 Consequently, implied intent to
preempt traditional state tort doctrines has only occasionally been found.63 To apply implied
conflict preemption doctrine, the federal regulatory scheme and its objectives must be
discerned.64 The objectives of the FDCA in prescription drug labeling and the nature of the
regulatory scheme are the subject of the next section.
A. General Regulation under Federal Food and Drug Laws
Federal regulation of food and drugs occurred as early as the mid-nineteenth century but
began in earnest in 1906 with enactment of the Pure Food and Drug Act.65 The 1906 Act was
prompted by concerns raised by state food and drug regulators over adulterated and misbranded
food products moving in interstate commerce and contaminating the food and drug supply.66 The
states had regulated the safety of food and drugs since the earliest days of our country’s history.67
State regulators encouraged, indeed implored,68 the national government to create a federal
agency because of concerns over the states’ inability to reach the interstate sale of fraudulent
products and, thus, to protect consumers from them.69
62Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 83 (1990).
63See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Corp., 529 U.S. 861, (2000) (finding implied conflict preemption of
state tort common law damages action). Geier is discussed in more detail infra notes and accompanying text. See
also Ausness, supra note at 922-24, 928 (“[I]n the years prior to Cipollone the Court generally refused to preempt
state tort claims, even where there was an important federal regulatory interest at stake.”); Davis, Unmasking the
Presumption, supra note at 990-993 (discussing the Supreme Court’s important early cases on implied preemption of
common law damages actions).
64See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (discussing assessment of federal objectives in
implied preemption inquiry.) See also Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note at 979.
65For a history of the early regulation of food and drugs in this country, see 1 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN. §§ 3:1 - 3.4 (2d. ed. 2005)(hereafter O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. 2D).
66O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. 2D at § 3:2.
67Id. at § 25:1.
68See Regler, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1933). See also
O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN 2D at § 25:1. For additional discussion of the history of the FDCA, see the
FDA’s website, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history, and http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html.
69O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. 2D at § 25:1 (overview of relationship between the FDA and state
governments).
The modern version of the federal food and drug regulatory scheme dates from the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938.70 The 1938 Act was adopted to protect the public health by
enforcing certain standards of purity and effectiveness as well as preventing the sale of
misbranded or adulterated products.71 The 1938 legislation extended control over more products
and enlarged and stiffened the penalties for its disobedience.72 In 1962, the Kefauver-Harris
Amendments were passed to add the requirement of drug efficacy as well as greater safety and
introduced a rigorous new drug approval process.73 A variety of amendments to the 1938 Act
over the ensuing years74 has added to the complexity of the regulatory scheme and heightened the
FDA’s ability to achieve its public safety goals.
The key protection against the marketing of ineffective or unsafe prescription
pharmaceutical products comes from the New Drug Approval process which new drugs must
complete before being marketed.75 The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) is the
office primarily responsible for evaluating new drug approval applications and is the self-
described “consumer watchdog for the roughly 11,000 drugs on the market.”76 Within the
70Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301, et. seq. (2006). See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S.
689 (1948) (discussing purposes of FDCA); United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399 (1914)
(discussing similar purposes of predecessor Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906).
7121 U.S.C. § 331 (2006)(describing prohibited acts of adulteration and misbranding). See also United States v.
Diapulse Corp. of America, 457 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1972)(discussing purposes of Act to prevent adulterated and
misbranded food and drugs); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Food and Drug Admin., 484 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Del.
1980)(same). See generally Michelle Meadows, Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years, FDA
CONSUMER (Jan./Feb. 2006) (found at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2006/106_cder.html).
72United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); Research Labs. v. United States 167 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1948).
73Kefauver-Harris Amendments to FDCA, Pub. L. 87-781, 76 Stat. 788-89 (Oct. 1962). See Meadows, supra note
71 (“Before marketing a drug, firms now had to prove not only safety, but also provide substantial evidence of
effectiveness for the product's intended use. . . . Also critically, the 1962 amendments required that the FDA
specifically approve the marketing application before the drug could be marketed, another major change.")
For a discussion of drug efficacy requirements, see Anita Bernstein, [article presented at R-P—call Anita for status).
74See, e.g, Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub.L. 108-282, Title II, § 201, 118 Stat.
905 (2004); Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. 107-09, § 1, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002); Dietary Supplement
Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-417, § 1(a), 108 Stat. 4325 (1994); Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. 103-80, § 1, 107 Stat. 773 (1993); and Medical Device Amendments of 1976,
Pub. L. 94-295, § 1(a), 90 Stat. 539 (1976).
75Id. § 355 (new drug application requirements). See also 21 C.F.R. pt. 314 (regulations for new drug approval
applications). Stories about the expense of the drug application process are legendary and are the backdrop to many
calls for reform of the process. See, e.g., Clifton Leaf, How our National Obsession with Drug Safety is Killing
People – And What We Can Do About It, FORTUNE, at 107 (February 20, 2006).
76 Meadows, supra note 71 at 1. See also Leaf, supra note 75 at 112-113 (explaining drug application process and its
limitations);
CDER, an Office for New Drug Approval oversees the process.77 Once a drug is approved and
on the market, fewer regulations exist to enable the FDA to follow the experience of an approved
drug’s users. The office responsible for policing the safety of prescription drugs, the Drug Safety
Oversight Board (DSOB), was created in 2005 at least in part as the result of the withdrawal
from the market of the osteo-arthritis pain reducer, VIOXX and the perceived lack of action by
the FDA in response to information regarding the risk of increased cardiac events in its users.78
The DSOB was recently criticized by the Government Accountability Office which described it
as “underfunded and understaffed, and lacks a clear and effective method to decide whether and
how to act when it finds that a drug is unsafe.”79 The GAO Report stated: “The FDA lacks clear
and effective processes for making decisions about providing management oversight of post-
marketing safety issues.”80 The GAO Report, prepared at the request of Congress, concluded
that the FDA needed increased legal authority to require post-marketing clinical trials to obtain
risk information, describing “serious limitations in the data” which currently support post-
marketing safety initiatives.81
The regulations also provide that, once approved, if a prescription drug manufacturer
subsequently fails to comply with any applicable regulation, the prescription drug may, as a
result, be considered misbranded or adulterated under the Act.82 Penalties for selling an
adulterated or misbranded drug or device may be assessed against the seller,83 non-compliant
products may be seized,84 and injunctive relief is available in federal district court.85 Of course,
77For a complete discussion of the CDER and the Office of New Drugs and their organization, see
http://www.fda.gov/cder/cderorg/ond_reorg.htm. The application process is detailed at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/default.htm.
78See FDA Statement on Vioxx and Recent Allegations and the Agency’s Continued Commitment to Sound Science
and Peer Review, FDA Press Release (Nov. 14, 2004); Hearings before Senate Health, Education and Pensions
Committee (Feb. 28, 2005; March 3, 2005). For a description of the DSOB, see FDA Improvements in Drug Safety
Monitoring, FDA Press Release (Feb. 15, 2005) (“emboldened vision” of FDA includes DSOB to oversee
management of drug safety issues, and will provide emerging information to health providers and patients about the
risks and benefits of medicines).
79 Government Accountability Office Report, Drug Safety: Improvement Needed in FDA’s Post-Marketing
Decision-making and Oversight Process, at 1, 6 (March 2006). See also Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, “GAP Rips
Effectiveness of FDA’s Safety Office, L.A. TIMES (April 26, 2006).
80GAO Report, supra note 79 at 6.
81 Id. at 34.
8221 U.S.C. § 351 (adulterated drugs and devices defined); § 352 (misbranded drugs and devices defined) (2006).
83Id. at § 333.
84Id. at § 334.
85Id. at § 332.
the FDA must have sufficient information on which to base an action for penalties. Mandatory
reporting by manufacturers of the results of post-marketing clinical trials is not required.86
To be misbranded, a regulated product’s labeling must be “false or misleading in any
particular.”87 Proper labeling includes certain identifying information, such as the name and
place of business of the manufacturer, and prominent placement of information on the label to
insure readability.88 Proper labeling also includes the established name of the drug and
information on the proportion of active ingredients and their established names, if any.89
Most importantly, proper labeling includes “adequate directions for use” and “adequate
warnings against use . . . where its use may be dangerous to health, or against unsafe dosage.”90
Labeling is written for the health care practitioner because prescription drugs require
“professional supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug.”91 A
physician acts as the “learned intermediary” between the manufacturer and the patient who is
intended to use and benefit from the drug but who needs the physician to assess the risk and
possible benefit of the product for the patient’s condition.92 Tort liability for prescription drugs
is based primarily on allegations of inadequate warnings of risk or improper use on the labeling
resulting in insufficient advice to the prescribing physician about the potential harms of the
drug.93 How such warnings are created, approved, and modified through the FDA’s labeling
approval process is explored in the next sub-section.
86 Leaf, supra note at 120 (“PhRMA, the industry’s powerful trade group, continues to fight the idea of mandatory
reporting, but promises that its member companies will offer more data voluntarily.”).
87Id. at § 352 (a).
88Id. at § 352(b), (c). FDA approved labeling is defined generally at § 321(m).
89Id. at § 352(e).
90Id. at § 352 (f).
91Id. at § 353(b).
92MADDEN AND OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note at § 22:8 – 22.11, p. 564-75. Many academic
commentators and some courts have criticized the learned intermediary doctrine as it applies to prescription drugs
that are widely advertised to the consumer, otherwise known as the direct-to-consumer advertised products. See
Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999) (rejecting learned intermediary doctrine in case of direct to
consumer advertised contraceptive device); Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to
Greater Tort Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 92 (2002).
93See MADDEN AND OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY , supra note at §§ 22:9, 22:10. See also Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966)(one of earliest cases discussing manufacturer’s duty to warn physician, as
learned intermediary).
Liability for the defective design, or formula, of a prescription drug is not the subject of this Article. That
topic is the subject of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1998),and its predecessor,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k (1965). A number of cases and scholarly articles address design
defect liability for pharmaceutical products. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); George
B. Prescription Drug Labeling Regulations
A number of sources are available for physicians to access information about the
prescription drugs they may consider for treatment of their patients’ medical conditions.94
“Labeling” is the set of documents that accompany the drug to the prescribing physician and the
end user.95 The FDA must assure that the statutorily required information is adequately
communicated to those users but it does not create the labeling. It approves proposed labeling
provided to it by the manufacturer after review of the manufacturer’s application pursuant to the
New Drug Approval regulations.96 A number of regulations have been adopted by the FDA to
accomplish its task.
The FDA labeling regulations include general requirements on the content and format of
labeling for prescription drugs.97 These regulations then refer to more specific requirements
detailing what is to be included in the required labeling.98 The specific requirements indicate the
data that must be included, the order in which it must be included, and the indication and usage
information that must be provided.99 The labeling regulation states that “serious adverse
reactions and potential safety hazards” must be described.100 New drug applications are required
Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L. J. 1087 (2000);
and James Henderson and Aaron Twerski, Drug Designs are Different, 111 YALE L. J. 151 (2000).
94For example, the Physician’s Desk Reference, or PDR, is a compilation of the labeling inserts that accompany
prescription drugs for easy physician access. “The PDR is an annual publication, a compendium of information
about all ethical drugs, which reproduces the information from the package inserts of all of them. The PDR is found
in the offices of most United States physicians.” MADDEN AND OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note at §
22:11, at p. 575. See also http://www.PDR.net for the online version of the PDR.
9521 U.S.C. § 321(m). See also, O’REILLY, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN 2D, supra note at § 15:9.
9621 U.S.C. § 355 (2004)(defining application requirements for new drug approvals). See also 71 Fed. Reg. at 3922
(“A prescription drug product’s FDA-approved labeling . . . is a compilation of information about the product,
approved by the FDA, based on the agency’s thorough analysis of the new drug application (NDA) . . . submitted by
the applicant.”).
9721 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2006).
98Id. at § 201.57.
99Id. at § 201.57(a), (b), ( c), (d).
100Id. at § 201.57(e), (f).
to contain copies of the labeling proposed by the manufacturer101 as well as a summary of the
contents of that labeling.102
The FDA described this labeling formation process in its amicus brief in Motus: “FDA’s
decision as to appropriate labeling is based on the evidence submitted by the applicant, as well as
on the agency’s review of other relevant information. Commonly, a drug manufacturer and FDA
will discuss in detail the proposed drug labeling, including the various warnings to be placed on
the proposed drug labeling . . . Based on the known scientific evidence, appropriate warnings are
drafted to express the known risks, while avoiding the statement of unsubstantiated risks that
may unnecessarily deter use of the drug.”103 The labeling formulation process is one of give-and-
take with oversight by the FDA. The burden is on the manufacturer to submit information
consistent with the regulations in support of its application.
Post-approval changes to labeling are permitted under certain circumstances. A
manufacturer is permitted to make certain changes only after first obtaining prior FDA approval
for the labeling change.104 These “major changes” include changes in the formulation of the drug
or its substance.105 Manufacturers may make unilateral labeling changes without prior FDA
approval “to include a warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of a
serious hazard with a drug; a causal relationship need not have been proved.”106 The FDA need
not approve the labeling before the manufacturer revises it under this section, but a supplemental
application, a Supplemental Submission for Changes Being Effected, or SSCBE, to effect the
change must be submitted.107 Such a unilateral labeling change has been called a “safety valve”
because it encourages manufacturer labeling changes to permit the addition of new warnings
when severe risks become known that were not anticipated when the drug was originally
10121 C.F.R. § 314.50(e)(2)(ii)(2006).
102Id. at § 314.50(c)(2)(i).
103Motus Amicus Brief of United States, supra note at 5.
10421 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) (“major” labeling changes require prior FDA approval).
105 Id. (“major changes” include changes in the qualitative or quantitative formulation of the drug or changes that
may affect drug substance).
106Id. at § 201.57(e). This section of the regulation also provides the FDA with authority to require a “prominently
displayed box” with particularly important warning or risk information whose location is specified by the FDA. Id.
This is known as a “black box warning.”
107Id. at §314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A). See also Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726 (D. Minn. 2005) (discussing
SSCBE process and its effect); Dusek v. Pfizer, Inc., 2004 WL 3631155 (S. D. Tex., November 22, 2004) (same).
approved.108 The FDA must ultimately approve the labeling change,109 but the regulation “was
promulgated precisely to allow drug-makers to quickly strengthen label warnings when evidence
of new side effects is discovered.”110 Nevertheless, manufacturers initiate labeling changes but
commonly do not implement them without FDA approval.111 Typically, the FDA and the
manufacturer negotiate about any labeling change contemplated prior to implementation.112
In the preamble to the FDA’s new final labeling regulation, the FDA takes the position
that any approved labeling preempts state common law tort actions, in spite of the manufacturer’s
obligation to alter labeling when important safety information is acquired, so that the
manufacturer is not placed in the position of having to change labeling in response to possible
tort liability, but may rest on prior FDA approval of labeling. The new regulation and its attempt
to affect preemption doctrine are discussed in the next sub-section.
C. New Regulation on Labeling for Prescription Drugs
The new labeling regulation alters the requirements for the labeling of prescription drugs
and is intended to make that labeling clearer, more concise, and more usable for physicians and
patients.113 The new regulation has the following features: (1) introduces a “Highlights” section
to labeling which will provide immediate access to a drug’s most commonly referenced
material;114 (2) reorders and reorganizes the contents of labeling, introducing graphical
requirements;115 and (3) makes warning and adverse reaction information more accessible.116 The
108O’Reilly, supra note at 293-94 (“FDA’s regulations and policies encourage prompt action by the drug companies
to improve their warnings when the data justifies such enhancements.”) See also Werner v. Upjohn, Inc., 628 F.2d
848 (4th Cir. 1980).
10921 C.F.R. at § 314.70(c)(6)(iii).
110Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 729 (D. Minn. 2005) (citing 30 Fed. Reg. 59290 (Jan. 30, 1965) and
44 Fed. Reg. 37447 (June 6, 1979)). See also Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1033-1034
(S.D. Ill. 2001)(discussing manufacturer’s ability to supplement warnings under FDA regulations).
111See 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (January 24, 2006)(discussion of labeling procedures in comments to new labeling
regulation); See also Motus Amicus Brief of United States, supra note at 17 (discussing ultimate FDA approval
required for all labeling changes).
112 See Vioxx data development press release, supra note . See also, GAO Report on Drug Safety, supra note at .
11371 Fed. Reg. 3922 (January 24, 2006). See also FDA Announces Final Rule on the Requirements for Prescribing
Information for Drug and Biological Products, Press Release (Jan. 18, 2006). The labeling regulation change was
prompted by “an increase in the length, detail, and complexity of prescription drug labeling, making it harder for
health care practitioners to find specific information and to discern the most critical information.” 71 Fed. Reg. at
3922.
11471 Fed. Reg. at 3923.
115Id.
final regulation applies to new and recently approved drugs, those approved after 2001, and the
former labeling requirements will continue to apply to older approved drugs.117
The regulation lists the general categories of information to be placed into the new
“Highlights” section. Those categories include: a Boxed Warning, Recent Major Changes,
Indications and Usage, Contraindications, and Warnings and Precautions.118 The drug
manufacturer chooses the information to be included in each of section, including the “Warning
and Precautions” section of the new labeling.119 “Judgment will continue to be necessary” in
deciding which information must be emphasized.120
Physicians and health care practitioners expressed “unequivocal enthusiasm” for the
“Highlights” section while manufacturers were either opposed or “strongly” opposed to it.121
Manufacturer opposition was based, in part, on the obligation to choose the important warnings
or other information to include while omitting other information which might cause the
“Highlights” section to be misleading.122 Similarly, several comments suggested more specific
criteria were needed to enable manufacturers to choose consistently the appropriate information
to be included in the central “Highlights” section.123 The manufacturers were concerned at least
in part about potential competitive disadvantages that might result.124 The FDA, acknowledging
the concerns, suggested that it is “essential for FDA to review and approve most proposed
116Id.
117 Id. at 3923-26. To assist manufacturers in complying with the new regulation, the FDA has produced four
Guidance Documents in addition to the almost 200-page regulation with comments. Id. at 3929. Guidance
documents are authorized to provide additional information to regulated industries about compliance with FDA
regulations and to inform the general public about FDA actions. 21 U.S.C. § 371(h)(1) (2004).
118Id. at 3924.
119Id. at 3930. FDA's guidance document on “Warnings and Precautions,” intended to assist manufacturers with
how to determine the contents of that section, states that it “does not establish legally enforceable responsibilities.
Instead, Guidances describe the Agency's current thinking on a topic and should be viewed only as recommendations,
unless specific regulatory or statutory requirements are cited.” See Guidance for Industry, Warnings and
Precautions, Contraindications, and Boxed Warnings Sections of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products – Content and Format, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/index.html (January 18, 2006).
12071 Fed. Reg. at 3932.
121Id. at 3931.
122Id.
123Id. at 3932.
124Id.
changes to the information in Highlights” and consequently is revising its regulations on
supplementing approvals.125
Consistent with its predecessor, the new regulation requires manufacturers to revise
labeling unilaterally to include warnings about “clinically significant hazards” as soon as there is
“reasonable evidence of a causal association” with the drug.126 This language is slightly more
rigorous in that it requires evidence of a connection between a drug and the risk to be warned
about of “clinically significant hazards” before changing approved labeling, though a causal
relationship still is not required.127 Manufacturers continue to have “permission to add risk
information to the Full Prescribing Information (FPI) without first obtaining FDA approval.”128
Manufacturers maintain some discretion under the new regulation to choose what to say
in drug labeling and how to say it, with considerable FDA oversight as before. Perhaps it is this
necessary exercise of manufacturer discretion that prompted the FDA to include a section in the
preamble about the product liability implications of the proposed rule.129
D. Proposed Preemptive Effect of the New Labeling Regulation
The FDA’s historical position on preemption has been that common law tort liability is an
important component of the regulation of prescription drugs and that federal regulation is not
intended to displace it.130 The FDA favored the concurrent operation of state tort law for almost
the entire first century of its existence based on (1) its inability to anticipate every way a
consumer could be injured by the products it regulated, and (2) the lack of a federal remedy to
provide redress for injured consumers.131 The preamble to the new labeling regulation now
125Id. In particular, the FDA is revising 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii), the “safety valve” mentioned earlier at supra
note , which permits a manufacturer to alter a label to introduce new and important safety information. Id.
126New Regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(a)(5), states: “In accordance with §§ 314.70 . . . the labeling must be revised
to include a warning about a clinically significant hazard as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal
association with a drug; a causal relationship need not have been definitely established.” See 71 Fed. Reg. at 3990.
127 See discussion of current labeling regulation supra notes and accompanying text.
12871 Fed. Reg. at 3934, 3969.
129Id. at 3933.
130See supra notes and accompanying text. See also Caraker v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1036-
1037 (S.D. Ill. 2001)(FDA historical position against preemption chronicled).
131Motus Amicus Brief of Public Citizen, supra note at 12 (“[W]hen Congress was considering legislation that
ultimately was enacted as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, it made its intentions clear. Congress
specifically rejected a proposal to include a private right of action for damages caused by faulty or unsafe products
regulated under the Act on the ground that such a right of action already existed under state common law.” Citing
Hearings Before Subcomm. of Comm. on Commerce on S. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 400, 403 (1933)). See also
argues, however, that product liability lawsuits have “directly threatened the agency’s ability to
regulate manufacturer dissemination of risk information for prescription drugs.”132
The FDA has formally regulated on preemption before, in its implementation of the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 to the FDCA.133 In that statute, Congress included an
express preemption provision which delegated to the FDA the authority to exempt state
regulations from its preemptive effect and which permitted the FDA to assess the preemptive
effect that the MDA and regulations promulgated pursuant to it would have on state laws.134 As
the Supreme Court said in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,135 “FDA regulations implementing that grant
of authority establish a process by which States or other individuals may request an advisory
opinion from the FDA regarding whether a particular state requirement is pre-empted by the
statute.”136
Unlike the formally promulgated regulation under the MDA, the new prescription drug
labeling regulation does not contain a section on its preemptive effect but, rather, discusses
preemption in the preamble.137 That discussion reiterates the litigation positions taken in Motus
Borden Co. v. Liddy, 200 F. Supp. 221, 225 (S.D. Iowa 1961) (federal food labeling regulations provided a minimum
level of safety which could be supplemented by more stringent state regulations); Porter, supra note 7 at .
13271 Fed. Reg. at 3933. The FDA cites three cases which arguably do not call for preemption alarm. Dowhal v.
SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 88 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2004), ultimately found that a FDA warning on nicotine
replacement therapy drugs conflicted with, and thus preempted, a state warning, despite a savings clause in Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 specifically protecting the requirement. Motus v. Pfizer, Inc. 358
F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) was resolved in favor of the manufacturer on causation. In re Paxil Litigation, 296 F.
Supp.2d 1374 (J.P.M.L. 2003), is in multi-district litigation consolidated proceedings.
13321 U.S.C. § 360k (2006)(express preemption provision of Medical Device Amendments of 1976); 21 C.F.R. §
808.1 to 808.5 (2006) (regulations implementing preemption provision). For a discussion of preemption under the
Medical Device Amendments, see infra notes and accompanying text.
13421 U.S.C. § 360k(a)
135Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (interpreting express preemption provision of MDA; finding no
preemption of common law damages claims).
136Id. at 496.
13771 Fed. Reg. at 3969. The National Conference on State Legislatures has expressed opposition “to the inclusion
of language that would preempt state product liability laws” in the final regulation, and to the process by which the
preemption language was included. See Letter to Secretary Mike Leavitt, Secretary, Department of Health and
Human Services, from National Conference of State Legislatures, Re: Food and Drug Administration Final Rule on
the Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, dated January 13, 2006.
and other product liability cases.138 The preamble suggests that preemption of state tort law is
the FDA’s “longstanding view” on preemption,139 but that description appears at odds with prior
statements of the FDA.140
The preamble articulates the preemption position by generally arguing, consistent with
what implied conflict preemption doctrine requires, that state law tort actions frustrate the
agency’s implementation of federal objectives.141 The FDA disagrees with the assertion widely
made that its labeling requirements are “minimum safety standards” and charges that
characterization as a “misunderstanding of the Act.”142 The FDA takes the position that its
regulations can establish both a floor and a ceiling.143 When additional labeling requirements
may not be more protective of patients, “they can erode and disrupt the careful and truthful
representation of benefits and risks that prescribers need to make appropriate judgments about
drug use. Exaggeration of risk could discourage appropriate use of a beneficial drug.”144 The
FDA has expressed the overwarning concern in recent medical device cases seeking greater
preemptive effect of those regulations.145
After articulating the arguments in favor of preemption, the FDA identifies those claims
which would be impliedly preempted by its new labeling regulation.146 It protects manufacturers
for choices they make about what to include in the new “Highlights” section of the regulation.147
It also seeks to codify its position in Motus that if a label was proposed to the FDA and
13871 Fed. Reg. at 3934: “In order to more fully address the comments expressing concern about the product liability
implications of revising the labeling for prescription drugs, we believe it would be useful to set forth in some detail
the arguments made in those amicus briefs.”
139 Id.
140 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
14171 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934.
142Id. at 3934-35.
143Id. at 3935.
144Id. To illustrate the overwarning concern, the preamble uses a case in which a state court found federal
preemption of an inconsistent state regulation, not a product liability action. 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935. Ironically, the
overwarning concern was raised in Motus and other Zoloft cases in support of preemption, but ultimately the FDA
required a stronger warning of the heightened risk of suicidality which it had earlier rejected. See supra notes and
accompanying text.
145Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2004).
146Id. at 3935-36.
147Id. at 3936.
ultimately not required by the time plaintiff claims it should have been, the plaintiff’s claim
based on a failure to warn is preempted.148
The FDA admits that its position on preemption in the regulation is, in essence, a
reiteration of its prior litigation position149 which may change depending on the factual
circumstances presented. The FDA acknowledges that some state common law damages actions
will not be preempted.150 It does not address the potential complementary way in which common
law damages actions operate concurrently with FDA regulations by permitting compensation for
injury and thereby creating an additional incentive to public safety.
The FDA claims that existing preemption principles support its preemption analysis. The
proposed new regulation affects new and recently approved drugs, but the former regulation
continues to apply to older drugs.151 Consequently, the FDA is attempting to alter its historical
position against preemption and apply its new position retroactively to all drugs approved and
regulated under the former regulation. Because of the FDA’s attempt to distance itself from its
historical position against preemption and, at the same time, rely on existing preemption
principles, those principles will now be fully explored in the next Section.
IV. PREEMPTION UNDER THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUG LAWS
The Supreme Court has addressed the scope of federal preemption since the earliest days
of the regulatory state. While this Article will emphasize preemption analysis under the food and
drug laws, the Court’s preemption doctrine generally has been the subject of much academic
interest152 and that scholarship informs the following discussion.
148Id.
149Id.
150Id. at 3936 (those based on parallel federal and state requirements).
151See supra note and accompanying text.
152Symposium, Federal Preemption of State Tort Law: The Problem of Medical Drugs and Devices, 33 PEPP. L.
REV. 1 (2005); Davis, On Preemption, supra note ; Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note ; Ausness,
supra note ; Alexander Haas, Chipping Away at State Tort Remedies Through Preemption: Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., 89 CAL. L. REV. 1927 (2001); Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Study in Judicial Sleight of Hand: Did
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Eradicate the Presumption Against Preemption, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (2002);
Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE U. L. REV. 475, 503-
510 (2002); Marin R. Scordato, Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2001);
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 290-91 (2000); Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88
GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000).
A. Preemption Doctrine Under the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906153
Shortly after enactment of the first federal food and drug law, questions arose regarding
how much state authority it displaced. In Savage v. Jones,154 the Court was asked to determine
whether the federal legislation affected an effort by the State of Indiana to require the inspection
and additional labeling of an animal feed additive that federal regulators had concluded was not a
food and, therefore, not subject to the federal Act’s requirements.155 The seller of the food
additive claimed that it was marketed as an herbal treatment for animals, not as feed, and
consequently escaped federal regulations.156 Further, because Congress had regulated in the
field, the seller argued that the states were entirely foreclosed from regulating.157
The Court, after rejecting the argument that the Indiana statute was unconstitutional
because of its interference with interstate commerce,158 noted that Congress did not expressly
declare its intention to prevent the States from regulating within the subject of food and drugs.159
The Court then described the applicable implied preemption inquiry:
For when the question is whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entire
scheme of the statute must, of course, be considered, and that which needs must
be implied is of no less force than that which is expressed. If the purpose of the
act cannot otherwise be accomplished–if its operation within its chosen field else
must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect–the state law
must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power.
But the intent to supersede the exercise by the state of its police power as
to matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be inferred from the
mere fact the Congress has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a
limited field. In other words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of
Congress, fairly interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of the state.160
15334 Stat. at L. 768, U.S.Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1354.
154225 U.S. 501 (1912).
155Id. at 509.
156Id. at 511.
157Id. at 512.
158Id. at 528.
159Id. at 533.
160Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Court concluded that the Indiana statute was not impliedly preempted because of two
corollary principles the Court articulated: (1) Congress’ implied purpose to preempt must be
clearly manifested, and (2) the repugnance or conflict between the congressional purpose and the
state regulation must be “direct and positive,” so that the two acts could not be reconciled.161
The Indiana statute was found not to be in actual conflict with the federal regulation because it
did not impose conflicting standards nor did it oppose federal authority–it rather added
consistent, but more rigorous, regulation.162
Savage v. Jones was decided decades before the onslaught of post-Depression era
economic regulation and post-World War II civil rights and other public interest legislation.
Preemption doctrine was in its infancy. Nevertheless, Savage is an important foundational case
because it articulated a quite rigorous implied conflict preemption analysis in an early food and
drug labeling matter. Indeed, the Court continues to refer to Savage’s implied conflict
preemption analysis, suggesting its continuing influence.163
Building on its discussion of implied preemption in Savage, the Court in 1913 decided
McDermott v. Wisconsin.164 In McDermott, Wisconsin had enacted a food labeling provision
which appeared to be in direct conflict with a federal regulation.165 The U.S. Secretary of
Agriculture had concluded that the defendant’s corn syrup label was in compliance with the
federal statute’s misbranding provision.166 The Wisconsin statute required that, before sale, the
complying federal label had to be removed and replaced with an alternate label.167 To comply
with the Wisconsin statute, therefore, the seller had to remove the conforming federal label and,
161Id. at 537. The Court relied for support on a case holding that a state statutory action for civil damages for
transporting diseased cattle was not preempted by a federal statute regulating the animal industry because there was
no obstruction of the purposes of Congress by permitting the states to impose civil damages. The Court stated, “May
not these statutory provisions stand without obstructing or embarrassing the execution of the act of Congress? This
question must, of course, be determined with reference to the settled rule that a statute enacted in execution of a
reserved power of the state is not to be regarded as inconsistent with an act of Congress . . . unless the repugnance or
conflict is so direct and positive that the two acts cannot be reconciled or stand together.” Id. at 535. (citing
Missouri, K. & T. Rd. Co. v Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 624 (date)).
162Savage, 225 U.S. at 539.
163Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (explaining that Massachusetts’ Burma law was
impliedly preempted by foreign affairs power and congressional Burma Act). See also Davis, Unmasking the
Presumption, supra note at 1012 (discussing re-emergence of Savage in Court’s modern preemption cases).
164228 U.S. 115 (1913).
165Id. at 125-126.
166Id. at 127.
167Id. at 133.
possibly, suffer penalties as a result of misbranding.168 This is the first case in which the federal
government, at that time through the Secretary of Agriculture, took a position in favor of federal
preemption of a state food or drug regulation.
The Court concluded that the state’s attempt to regulate exclusively was an improper
interference with Congress’ authority.169 The Court explained:
Conceding to the state the authority to make regulations consistent with the
Federal law for the further protection of its citizens against impure and
misbranded food and drugs, we think to permit such regulation as is embodied in
this statute is to permit a state to discredit and burden legitimate Federal
regulations of interstate commerce, to destroy rights arising out of the Federal
statute which have accrued both to the government and the shipper, and to impair
the effect of a Federal law. . . .170
The problem with the Wisconsin statute was its attempt at exclusivity: the regulated seller could
not comply with both labeling requirements. Such “impossibility” of dual compliance has since
become a category of implied conflict preemption which the Court identifies but rarely applies.171
B. Early Preemption Doctrine under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938
Like its predecessor, the FDCA of 1938 does not have a generally applicable express
preemption provision.172 Therefore, preemption under the FDCA, whether of state and local
regulations or common law tort actions, must proceed under implied preemption doctrine.
Preemption doctrine during the years between the early twentieth century and the mid-
twentieth century is generally marked by a more generous attitude toward state regulation.173
During this time, the Supreme Court defined implied preemption doctrine more clearly.174
168Id.
169Id. at 134.
170Id.
171See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (discussing implied preemption
involving impossibility). See also Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note at 984-85.
172See supra notes and accompanying text.
173Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note at 978.
174Id. at 997.
During the period from the 1940s to the 1980s, implied preemption doctrine coalesced into the
now-standard categories of occupation of the field preemption and conflict preemption.175
Occupation of the field preemption occurs where Congress’ legislation is so
comprehensive that it occupies the entire field, displacing all state law.176 An important early
example of such field preemption is Hines v. Davidowitz.177 Hines found that a federal alien
registration statute preempted all state regulation because of the national interest, based on the
presence of foreign affairs concerns, in a uniform registration mechanism.178 The Court found
implied congressional intent to legislate exclusively because of the core national interest at
stake.179 The Court has rejected occupation of the field preemption under the FDCA.180
Conflict preemption occurs most frequently when the state law “stands as an obstacle” to
the accomplishment of federal objectives and, therefore, must yield.181 Preemption issues under
the FDCA have typically involved state or local regulation which allegedly impacted federal
regulatory objectives. An early example is Cloverleaf Butter v. Patterson,182 in which Alabama
officials seized substantial quantities of packing stock butter, used by the defendant in the
manufacture of processed butter sold in interstate commerce, because of concerns over its quality
under state food and drug regulation.183 The federal Department of Agriculture regulated the use
of the packing stock butter184 and was not authorized to seize the product until after it was
manufactured and moved in interstate commerce, when it might be considered adulterated.185
Consequently, the state law required seizure at a time which the federal law did not permit. The
175Id. at 988.
176Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (Alien Registration Act of 1940 occupied field, foreign affairs and
national treatment of aliens intended to be exclusive).
177Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
178Id. at 72-74.
179See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note at 978-79, 988-89.
180 Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718 (1985).
181See Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-713 (1985); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 (1941).
182Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 786 (1942).
183Id. at 165.
184Id. at 150. The Internal Revenue Service was also involved in regulating the product. Id.
185Id. at 166.
Company sought an injunction against the Alabama officials prohibiting them from seizing the
packing stock butter.186
The Supreme Court, relying on Savage and McDermott, concluded that the Alabama law
was preempted.187 The Court stated, “When the prohibition of state action is not specific but
inferable from the scope and purpose of the federal legislation, it must be clear that the federal
provisions are inconsistent with those of the state to justify thwarting the state regulation.”188
Recognizing that the line distinguishing cases of inconsistency is narrow, the Court found the
case to be more like McDermott in which the state law prohibited what the federal law
permitted.189 The Court distinguished Savage because the state law in issue in that case merely
required additional disclosures that the federal law neither required nor prohibited.190 In Savage,
federal law was agnostic on the value of the state regulation; in McDermott and Cloverleaf
Butter, federal law appeared to be affirmatively against the state’s regulatory choice.
The majority’s finding of implied conflict preemption in Cloverleaf Butter was based on
a minimal conflict191 and reflects a broad definition of actual conflict in which the Court rejects
the State’s argument that the two regulatory schemes could operate harmoniously.192 The
Court’s broad definition of the boundaries of federal authority was intended to minimize clashes
between the regulating authorities and free the regulated industry from inconsistencies.193 By
contrast, the dissenting opinion emphasized “due regard for the maintenance of our dual system
of government” which “demands that the courts do not diminish state power by extravagant
inferences regarding what Congress might have intended if it had considered the matter, or by
reference to their own conceptions of a policy which Congress has not expressed and is not
plainly to be inferred from the legislation which it has enacted.”194 Sixty years after Cloverleaf
Butter Company was decided, similar arguments continue to be made on both sides of the
preemption debate.
186Id. at 151.
187Id. at 158-59.
188Id. at 156.
189Id. at 158-59.
190Id. at 158.
191See 315 U.S. 148, 172-73 (Stone, C.J., dissenting)(“complete want of conflict between the two statutes;” state
statute “aids and supplements the federal regulation and policy”).
192Cloverleaf Butter Co., 315 U.S. at 169.
193Id.
194315 U.S. 148, 177 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
The Court did not address another FDCA preemption case until 1985 in Hillsborough
County, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.195 In the intervening years, the Court
decided a number of implied preemption cases. Importantly, in San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon,196 the Court was faced with an application of implied preemption doctrine to
state common law damages actions.197 San Diego Building Trades Council involved whether the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempted state tort actions by employers allegedly
injured in the course of peaceful picketing by labor activists.198 The Court spoke of the difficulty
of ascertaining congressional intent when the enacting Congress, writing twenty-five years
earlier, could not have foreseen the conflicts that would eventually arise.199 In finding implied
preemption based on a conflict with federal legislative objectives, the Court relied on two
considerations: (1) the case involved national labor policy about which Congress had legislated
“with broad strokes,”200 and (2) state regulation can be exerted through common law damages
actions as effectively as through more direct regulatory means.201 The Court continues to refer to
Garmon for these propositions.202 These two fundamental features of implied preemption
analysis, how to define the federal objectives with which state law arguably conflicts and the how
to assess the regulatory nature of common law damages actions, will be central to implied
preemption analysis under the FDCA.
In the 1980s, the Court refined its approach regarding the effect of common law damages
actions within implied preemption analysis. In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,203 the Court was
called upon to determine whether the Atomic Energy Act (AEA),204 which regulated the nuclear
energy industry, permitted state common law damages actions as a means of concurrent state
195Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
196San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
197Id. at 237-39.
198Id. at 241-46 (describing NLRA, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158).
199Id. at 240.
200Id.
201Id. at 246-47. For a more complete discussion of the importance of San Diego Building Trades Council, see
Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note at 982-983.
202 See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note at 982-983, 1001.
203Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
20442 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq (date). The AEA is administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, formerly the
Atomic Energy Commission. See id. § 2073 (defining NRC authority).
regulation. Karen Silkwood alleged contamination with plutonium through irregularities at the
Kerr-McGee Corp. nuclear power plant where she worked and sought personal injury and
punitive damages under negligence and strict liability doctrines.205
The AEA was enacted in 1954 to free the nuclear energy industry from total federal
control and to provide for private involvement.206 Some limited regulatory authority was given
to the states which had never before had any authority over nuclear power.207 The states were
precluded, however, from regulating the safety aspects of nuclear material.208 Thus, the
preemption provision of the AEA carved out of federal dominion some small state regulatory
authority.
The Supreme Court concluded unanimously that the AEA did not preempt Silkwood’s
compensatory damages action.209 The Court, after reviewing the Act’s legislative history and
other congressional actions regarding the AEA,210 stated, “It is difficult to believe that Congress
would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal
conduct.”211 The regulatory effect of common law damages actions was recognized but
considered consistent with federal objectives in the absence of clear congressional intent to
prohibit them. As an aside, and to be discussed in more detail shortly, for a time in the 1990s
after Cipollone and other cases failed to follow Silkwood’s approach to common law damages
actions, Silkwood was considered an anomaly in preemption analysis,212 but recent decisions
have resurrected the importance of its position on the effect of common law damages actions.213
One year after Silkwood, the Court addressed a preemption challenge under the FDCA,
though not one involving the regulatory effect of common law damages actions. In Hillsborough
205Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 243.
206The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284.
207Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190
(1983).
20842 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(4).
209Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 246. A majority of the Court held that the AEA similarly did not preempt Silkwood’s
punitive damages claim. Id.
210Id. at 249.
211Id. at 251 (“Indeed, there is no indication that Congress even seriously considered precluding the use of such
remedies either when it enacted the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 or when it amended it in 1959. This silence takes on
added significance in light of Congress’ failure to provide any federal remedy for persons injured by such conduct.”).
212 See, Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note at 1001, 1013-14.
213 See infra notes and accompanying text.
County Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.,214 a Florida county sought to regulate
the collection of blood plasma from paid donors by requiring additional limitations to those
required under federal regulations.215 The defendant blood plasma center argued for preemption
under both implied occupation of the field and conflict preemption.216 The Supreme Court
disagreed on both issues and reversed an appellate court finding of preemption.217
The Court, after describing the basic implied preemption doctrines applicable,218 noted
that the defendant “faces an uphill battle” in arguing for implied preemption. The hurdles to
preemption fell into two categories: (1) prior agency position against preemption;219 and (2) the
presumption that state or local regulation of matters related to health and safety can
constitutionally coexist with federal regulation.220
Regarding the FDA’s position against preemption, the court noted that its prior statement
“is dispositive on the question of implicit intent to pre-empt unless either the agency’s position is
inconsistent with clearly expressed congressional intent, . . . or subsequent developments reveal a
change in that position.”221 The FDA’s position against preemption had been made clear in
commentary to the blood collection regulations222 and even though the regulations had been
broadened since then, the FDA had not indicated that the new regulations “affected its disavowal
. . . of any intent to pre-empt.”223 The Court thus rejected occupation of the field preemption
even though the regulations were comprehensive,224 noting that “merely because the federal
provisions were sufficiently comprehensive to meet the need identified by Congress did not mean
214Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
215Id. at 710.
216Id. at 714.
217Id. at 712.
218Id. at 713. Preliminarily, the Court confirmed that preemption of local ordinances is analyzed in the same way as
the preemption of statewide laws. Id.
219Id. at 714.
220Id. at 715.
221 Id.at 714-15 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
222 Id. at 714.
223 Id. at 716-17. The Court states: “Thus, if an agency does not speak to the question of pre-emption, we will pause
before saying that the mere volume and complexity of its regulations indicate that the agency did in fact intend to
pre-empt. . . [W]e will seldom infer, solely from the comprehensiveness of federal regulations, an intent to pre-empt
in its entirety a field related to health and safety.” Id. at 718.
224Id. at 716.
that States and localities were barred from identifying additional needs or imposing further
requirements in the field.”225 The Court was “even more reluctant” to infer field preemption
from regulations than from statutes, saying, “To infer pre-emption whenever an agency deals
with a problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying that whenever a federal agency
decides to step into a field, its regulations will be exclusive.”226 The federal interest was not so
dominant to justify occupying the field given the historic primacy of state regulation in matters of
health and safety.227
The Court’s discussion of field preemption, and the importance of the FDA’s position
against preemption, informed its rejection of implied conflict preemption as well.228 The
defendant had argued that the local ordinances place more stringent requirements than the federal
requirements and, therefore, present a serious obstacle to the federal goal of “ensuring an
adequate supply of plasma.”229 The Court found this concern to be too speculative to support
pre-emption.230 First, there was little evidence in the record to support the factual assertion of
increased costs from the local regulations or the effect they would have on blood plasma
collection.231 Second, even if there had been evidence of increased costs to plasma collection
operators and an increased burden on donors imposed under the local regulation, they did not
necessarily interfere with the federal goal of maintaining an adequate plasma supply.232
According to the Court, neither Congress nor the FDA “has struck a particular balance between
safety and quantity;”233 rather, “the regulations which contemplated additional state and local
requirements merely establish minimum safety standards.”234
Finally, the Court noted that the FDA could promulgate preemption regulations “with
relative ease” but it had not done so.235 The Court attached significance to the absence of either a
FDA position or formal regulation on preemption: “Thus, since the agency has not suggested
225Id. at 717.
226Id.
227Id. at 719. Prior field preemption cases had involved a “special feature” supporting preemption--the foreign
affairs power. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
228Id. at 720.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 720-21.
232Id. at 721.
233 Id.
234Id. at 721.
235Id.
that the county ordinances interfere with federal goals, we are reluctant in the absence of strong
evidence to find a threat to the federal goal of ensuring sufficient plasma.”236 Because Congress
had delegated to the FDA administration of the federal program, the Court was strongly
influenced by the FDA’s position as reflected in the prior regulatory commentary and the FDA’s
silence on the matter in the case before it.237 Hillsborough County is a strong pro-state
regulation preemption decision under the FDCA that also provides insight into how important the
Court considers the agency’s position on preemption to be.
In summary, until the late 1980’s, the Court had found preemption under the FDCA only
in two narrow cases, both arguably involving impossibility.238 Those cases can now be said to
rest on shaky ground because of the increasingly narrow definition of actual conflict the Court
began to use in subsequent years.239 The Court certainly was influenced by the importance of
historic state regulation in the area of public health and safety in all these cases. After Silkwood ,
it would appear that common law damages actions would survive the implied conflict
preemption hurdles defined by the Court, absent clear indication of agency position to the
contrary. If the local regulations at issue in Hillsborough County did not create the kind of
obstacle to federal objectives required to preempt, the more indirect regulation of common law
damages actions would likely not be sufficient, particularly given the long tradition of permitting
such actions.
C. The Rise of Express Preemption Doctrine and the FDCA: Of Cipollone and Medtronic
A short seven years after Silkwood, the Court re-evaluated preemption doctrine as it
applied to common law damages actions. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,240 the Court,
applying preemption doctrine in a products liability action for the first time, concluded that
where Congress has included an express preemption provision, and that provision provides a
“reliable indicium of congressional intent,” the provision controls and an implied preemption
analysis is unnecessary.241 In such a case, the Court’s task was only to determine the scope of the
provision.242 Rarely had the Court given exclusive control to an express preemption provision,
236 Id.
237 Id.
238See supra notes ____ and accompanying text (discussing McDermott and Cloverleaf Butter).
239See supra notes and accompanying text (discussing Silkwood); see also Davis, Unmasking the Presumption,
supra note at 983-986, 989 (discussing narrowing of implied preemption doctrine during 1960s and 1970s).
240Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
241Id. at 517.
242Id. at 518, 523.
particularly as it applied to common law damages actions.243 Cipollone’s focus on defining the
scope of congressional intent narrowly out of respect for the presumption against preemption of
traditional state health and safety regulations and its discussion of the regulatory effect of
common law damages actions may continue to be important, however, in the implied preemption
context.
Cipollone involved the preemptive effect of the federal cigarette labeling and advertising
laws on products liability actions.244 The Court mentioned the presumption against federal
preemption of matters historically within the states’ police powers, and emphasized the
prominence of discerning congressional intent.245 The plurality opinion, written by Justice
Stevens, used the text of the provisions and the legislative history to preempt some, but not all,
common law damages actions.246 The plurality acknowledged that common law damages actions
can have an indirect regulatory effect247 but the dissenting justices recognized that the Court’s
preemption cases “have declined on several recent occasions to find the regulatory effects of state
tort law direct or substantial enough to warrant preemption.”248
In its next several products liability preemption cases, the Court adhered to its Cipollone
analysis and exclusively analyzed express preemption provisions. In Freightliner Corp. v.
Myrick,249 the Court found that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA)250
did not preempt state law claims based on the absence of anti-lock brakes on certain trucks
243See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note __, at 1001.
244Federal Cigarette Labeling Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000); Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000)(as amended).
245Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
246505 U.S. at 521-524. The 1965 cigarette labeling act’s preemption provision stated that “No statement relating to
smoking and health” shall be required on cigarette packages or in advertising.” 15 U.S.C. § 1335. The 1969 act
changed the preemption provision slightly to state that “No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law” regarding cigarette labeling or advertising. Id. The use of the phrase
“requirement or prohibition” was critical to the Court’s analysis of whether common law damages actions were
prohibited. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522-524.
247Id. at 524.
248Id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(referencing Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller,486 U.S. 174 (1988); English
v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990), and Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984)).
249 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
25015 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1)), analyzed in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,
514 U.S. 280 (1995)(no preemption because federal agency had not promulgated regulation addressing product
feature in issue).
because no federal standard existed requiring them.251 The Court left room for the operation of
implied preemption principles in the event that Congress’ intent could not be clearly established
from the express provision, however.252 Similarly, the Court found in CSX Transportation, Inc.
v. Easterwood 253 that the Federal Railroad Safety Act did not expressly preempt state common
law damages actions based on the location of railroad crossing devices because Congress’ intent
clearly permitted more rigorous state regulation.254 Interestingly, the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA), authorized to implement the FRSA, supported a broad reading of the
preemption provision but the Court rejected that reading as inconsistent with the statute’s plain
language.255
Preemption under the FDCA came before the Court next in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr256
which involved the express preemption provision of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976
(MDA).257 The MDA directs the FDA to regulate the safety and effectiveness of medical devices
based on the type of device involved and the method by which it is approved for marketing.258
Congress included an express preemption provision in the MDA which provides that states may
not establish “any requirement” which is “different from or in addition to” any FDA imposed
requirement regarding a device’s safety or effectiveness.259 In Medtronic, defendant sought
preemption of plaintiff’s design and manufacturing defect claims regarding its pacemaker
because the device had been approved through a pre-market notification process which permits
market approval if a device is substantially equivalent to one already on the market.260 The Court
was divided on whether the MDA preempted the plaintiff’s claims, but all justices agreed that the
express preemption provision controlled the analysis.261
251Freightliner Corp., 514 U.S. at 289-90.
252Id. at 284.
253 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993).
254Id. at 662 (preemption provision specifically exempts concurring, non-conflicting, state regulations from its
operation).
255Id. at 664.
256Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
25721 U.S.C. § 360k (2000).
258See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475-80 (detailing history of MDA and its regulatory scheme).
25921 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2000).
260518 U.S. at 477.
261Id. at 484-85, 503 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 509 (O’Connor, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Stevens’
plurality opinion suggested that actual conflict implied preemption analysis may be appropriate in certain
Even though Medtronic involves express preemption analysis, a number of important
features of the decision may affect implied conflict preemption under the FDCA more generally.
First, the Court reiterated the historic primacy of state regulation “to protect the health and safety
of their citizens” which supports the “great latitude” states have had to govern in this area.262
Consequently, the majority opinion considered the language of the express preemption provision
narrowly.263 The pre-market notification process, under which the pacemaker had been
approved, did not include specific requirements.264 The plurality opinion concluded that
common law damages actions based on design or labeling defects were not “requirements” for
purposes of the statute, stating that “we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly
preempt state law causes of action. . . That approach is consistent with both federalism concerns
and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety.”265 A majority of the
justices, however, thought that common law damages actions generally do impose requirements,
and, therefore, may be preempted under the statute if they differ from a clearly expressed federal
requirement.266
Second, all three Medtronic opinions explored the importance of agency position and
interpretation of agency regulations in determining the scope of preemption.267 The justices
disagreed on the extent to which they should rely on an agency’s position on preemption, though
in earlier cases the Court had noted that agency regulations could be informative on defining the
circumstances even when an express preemption provision was in issue, and cited Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514
U.S. 280 (1995). Id. at 503.
262Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475 (citing Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)).
263Id. at 487-88.
264The pre-market notification requirement, also known as the 510k notification process, permits marketing of
devices that are substantially equivalent to a device already on the market and is not as rigorous as the pre-market
approval process required of entirely new devices. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 476-80 for a description of the
processes and their differences. See generally S. FOOTE, MANAGING THE MEDICAL ARMS RACE: INNOVATION AND
PUBLIC POLICY IN THE MEDICAL DEVICE INDUSTRY (1992).
265Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 493-94.
266Id. at 509 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 505 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice
Breyer, whose opinion provided the final vote against preemption, stated that express preemption provisions should
be interpreted based on their “clear congressional command,” if one exists. If none, courts may infer that the
“relevant administrative agency posseses a degree of leeway” to proscribe the preemptive effect of its regulation.
Id.at 505.
267Id. at 495-96 (“The FDA regulations interpreting the scope of § 360k’s pre-emptive effect support the Lohrs’
view, and our interpretation of the pre-emption statute is substantially informed by those regulations.”); id. at 505-06
(Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 511-12 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
scope of preemption where consistent with statutory language.268 The FDA had adopted a
regulation which provided that preemption would occur only when the FDA had established
regulations specific to a particular device.269 The FDA had maintained that its preemption
position did not prohibit common law damages claims and, thus, narrowed the scope of
preemption.270 The plurality opinion’s interpretation of the scope of the preemption provision
was “substantially informed” by the agency’s regulations271 because of the “unique role”272 given
to it by Congress to implement provisions of the Act.273 The plurality, after comparing the state
common law requirements to the “entirely generic concerns” of the federal regulations,
concluded that “these general [common law] obligations are no more a threat to federal
requirements than would be a state-law duty to comply with local fire prevention regulations and
zoning codes, or to use due care in the training and supervision of a work force.”274 The majority
recognized, however, that a case in which the federal government “has weighed the competing
interests relevant to the particular requirement in question, reached an unambiguous conclusion
about how those competing considerations should be resolved in a particular case or set of cases,
and implemented that conclusion via a specific mandate on manufacturers or producers”275 might
present an entirely different case for preemption under the statute and its implementing
regulations.
Justice Breyer concurred, agreeing that “the relevant administrative agency possesses a
degree of leeway to determine which rules, regulations, or other administrative actions will have
pre-emptive effect.”276 In particular, the FDA has a “special understanding of the likely impact
268CSX Transp. Inc. v Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 670 (1993) (involving preemption of common law damages
actions under the Federal Railroad Safety Act); Norfolk & Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 355
(2000) (same; agency position on preemption not persuasive when inconsistent with prior agency position and with
statutory scheme). See Davis, On Preemption, supra note at 208 (discussing CSX Transp. v. Easterwood and Norfolk
& Southern Ry v. Shanklin).
269 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2000) (no preemption of state or local requirements that are “equal to, or substantially
identical to, requirements” imposed under the MDA); id. at § 808.1(d)(1) (no preemption of “state or local
requirements of general applicability”).
270 Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 Food & Drug L.J. 7, 7 (1997). See
also Ausness, supra note at 753.
271Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 495.
272Id. at 496.
273Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 371(a)). The plurality also noted that the FDA is uniquely qualified to determine whether a
particular form of state law “stands as an obstacle” to the fulfillment of federal objectives. Id. (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
274518 U.S. at 501-02.
275 Id. at 501.
276Id. at 505-06 (citing Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. 707, 721 (1985)).
of both state and federal requirements, as well as an understanding of whether (or the extent to
which) state requirements may interfere with federal objectives . . . The FDA can translate these
understandings into particularized pre-emptive intentions accompanying its various rules and
regulations.”277 Justice Breyer concluded that the express preemption provision did not fully
answer the preemption question.278 Consequently, he considered implied preemption principles
applicable, in conjunction with the FDA’s own regulatory understanding of preemption, to
conclude that there was no actual conflict between the federal requirements and the common law
“liability-creating premises” of state tort law.279
D. Implied Conflict Preemption and the FDCA: Of Geier and Buckman Co.
Justice Breyer authored the Court’s next opinion on the preemption of common law
damages actions, Geier v. American Honda Motor Company,280 which firmly reinstated implied
conflict preemption doctrine as central to preemption analysis. In Geier, the Court was asked to
analyze the effect of the express preemption provision in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act (“NTMVSA”) on a lawsuit alleging that a 1987 Honda was defective in design
because it did not have a driver’s side air bag.281 The NTMVSA contains a preemption provision
which states that whenever a federal motor vehicle safety standard, “FMVSS,”282 is in effect,
states may not establish or maintain any “safety standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance” which is not identical to the federal standard.283 The statute also contains a
“savings clause:” “Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this
sub-chapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.”284
277Id. at 506.
278Id. at 505.
279Id. at 508. Justice O’Connor rejected the FDA’s interpretation of the preemption provision insofar as it purported
to narrow the plain meaning of the statutory provision. Id. at 509, 512 (O’Connor, J., dissenting in part) (“It is not
certain that an agency regulation determining the pre-emptive effect of any federal statute is entitled to deference,
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996), but one pertaining to the clear statute at issue here is
surely not.”).
280Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
281Id. at 865. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et. seq.
(1988 ed.). The statute was re-codified in 1994 at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101- 30169 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
28215 U.S.C. § 1391(2): safety standard is a “minimum standard for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle
equipment performance.”
283Id. § 1392(d) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1)).
284Id. § 1397(k).
The Department of Transportation issued FMVSS 208 regarding Occupant Crash
Protection in 1967.285 After several revisions, the 1984 version, in issue in Geier, permitted
manufacturers to choose, with some restrictions, between air bags and seat belt systems.286 Ms.
Geier’s 1987 Honda did not have a driver’s side air bag. She was injured as a result and sued the
manufacturer based on the vehicle’s defective design.287
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, mirrored his analysis from Medtronic, concluding
that the express preemption provision did not preempt plaintiff’s common law actions because
that provision, read together with the savings clause, did not disclose congressional intent to
defeat product liability claims in the face of only a federal minimum standard of safety.288 The
Court then asked whether the savings clause also prevented the operation of “ordinary pre-
emption principles insofar as those principles instruct us to read statutes as preempting state laws
(including common law rules) that actually conflict with the statute or federal standards
promulgated thereunder?”289 The Court concluded it did not, reasoning that it would be
impermissible “to take from those who would enforce a federal law the very ability to achieve the
law's congressionally mandated objectives that the Constitution, through the operation of
ordinary pre-emption principles, seeks to protect.”290 The Court’s failure to rely on the express
preemption provision has been much criticized given the Court’s prior reliance on them in both
Cipollone and Medtronic.291 The Court’s implied conflict preemption analysis, therefore, must
be considered extremely important guidance to future implied preemption cases.
285See Pub. Citizen v. Steed, 851 F.2d 444, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(“Passive restraint regulation (Standard 208) has
advanced over the years along a protracted, winding, sometimes perilous course.”). See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34-38 (1983) (history of Standard 208).
286Geier, 529 U.S. at 865. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208; 49 Fed. Reg. 28999 (1984) (Standard 208). For a full
discussion of the administrative history of FMVSS 208, see Geier, 529 U.S. at 875-877; id. at 889-892 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). See also Ralph Nader and Joseph Page, Automobile-Design Liability and Compliance with Federal
Standards, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 415 (1996).
287Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
288Id. at 868.
289Id. at 869.
290Id. at 872. The Court had shown concern for “careful regulatory scheme[s] established by federal law” in its prior
implied conflict preemption cases and the regulatory scheme in Geier deserved such concern. Id. at 870 (quoting
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106-07 (2000)).
291 See Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note at 1005-1012; Ausness, supra note at 968.
The Court found that an “actual conflict”292 existed and thus plaintiff’s common law
actions were preempted.293 Two important components of its analysis need mentioning. First,
the Court rejected as conclusive the statutory definition of federal standards as “minimum”
standards of care.294 Instead, the Court reviewed carefully the history of the regulation which had
been, at times, unpopular with almost everyone.295 Consequently, the views of the various
Secretaries’ of Transportation were very influential,296 as well as the comments to the original
standard297 and the current Secretary’s position, described in an amicus brief in the case, “[that]
the 1984 version of FMVSS 208 ‘embodies the Secretary's policy judgment that safety would
best be promoted if manufacturers installed alternative protection systems in their fleets rather
than one particular system in every car.’”298 The Court’s review of the regulation’s tortured
history identified the various Secretaries’ efforts to balance a variety of concerns which impacted
its primary objective of consumer safety, including obstacles to consumer acceptance of restraint
devices, industry reluctance to adopt restraint devices, and Congress’ responses to a variety of
public pressures regarding the restraints.299 The Court recognized that the standard reflected a
variety of considerations, “deliberately sought variety,”300 and was, therefore, neither a minimum
nor a maximum standard.
Second, in defining the federal objectives in issue, the Court “placed some weight” upon
DOT’s own interpretation of those objectives and its conclusion that the tort actions would stand
as an obstacle to those objectives.301 The Court justified that level of deference to the agency’s
position based on 1) the technical subject matter; 2) the complex and extensive nature of the
relevant history and background; and 3) the agency’s “uniquely qualified” position to
comprehend the likely impact of state requirements.302 The consistency of the Secretary of
Transportation’s position on preemption over time was also influential in supporting the Court’s
292By relying on “actual conflict” preemption, the Court rejected a categorization of its implied preemption doctrine,
noting it “sees no grounds . . . for attempting to distinguish among types of federal-state conflict for purposes of
analyzing whether such a conflict warrants pre-emption in a particular case.” Id. at 874.
293Id. at 883.
29449 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(9).
295 529 U.S. at 875-877.
296 Id. at 875.
297 Id.
298Id. at 881 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 25).
299Id.at 877-879.
300 Id. at 878.
301 Id. at 883.
302Id.
position. That position had been taken in two recent cases, through amicus briefs.303 The lack of
a formal statement on pre-emption was, therefore, not determinative.304 Relying on Hillsborough
County, the Court clearly rejected the requirement of a formal agency statement on preemption to
support conflict preemption, stating “While we certainly accept the dissent’s basic position that a
court should not find pre-emption too readily in the absence of clear evidence of a conflict, . . . to
insist on a specific expression of agency intent to pre-empt, made after notice-and-comment
rulemaking, would be in certain cases to tolerate conflicts that an agency, and therefore Congress,
is most unlikely to have intended.”305
The Court weighed the stated federal objectives against the general interest that the states
have in promoting the health and welfare of citizens by compensating for personal injuries
suffered as a result of defective products. The Court did not mention the presumption against
preemption306 but it discussed the state’s general interest in the health and welfare of its
citizens.307 The Court was sympathetic to this important concern.308 Nevertheless, the Court was
of the strong opinion that the state and federal objectives could not be reconciled: “Such a state
law--i.e. a rule of state tort law imposing such a duty--by its terms would have required
manufacturers of all similar cars to install air bags rather than other passive restraint systems, . . .
It thereby would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of objectives that the federal
regulators sought.”309
Finally, the plaintiff argued that a jury finding of defectiveness based on the lack of an air
bag did not conflict with the federal objectives; indeed, state law promoted those objectives.310
While acknowledging that Congress intended some non-uniformity in the regulatory system it
created, the Court concluded that jury-assessed standards would lead to unpredictability and
uncertainty in the standard of due care.311 The Court recognized that “tort law may be somewhat
different, and that related considerations--for example, the ability to pay damages instead of
303 Id. (citing Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick ,and Wood v. General Motors).
304Id. at 884. For a proposal that would consider agency determinations of preemption only if they were part of the
rule-making process when the regulation was formulated, see Ausness, supra note , at 50.
305Id. at 885
306Id. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Davis, Unmasking the Presumption, supra note , at 1008; Raeker-
Jordan, supra note , at 8-9.
307529 U.S. at 880.
308Id. at 881.
309Id..
310Id. at 882.
311Id..
modifying one’s behavior--may be relevant for pre-emption purposes,”312 the Court found those
considerations not to be persuasive in this instance.
The Court’s next preemption case again involved the Medical Device Amendments of the
FDCA. In Buckman Company v. Plaintiff’s Legal Committee,313 the Court was called upon to
determine whether the MDA preempted the plaintiff’s fraud claim based on the defendant’s
misrepresentations to the FDA to obtain approval of its orthopedic bone screws.314 The Court
used implied conflict preemption principles without engaging in an express preemption analysis,
stating that the express preemption provision did not cover the matter so implied conflict
preemption must operate.315 Because policing fraud on a federal agency was uniquely federal
and not a subject which states had traditionally governed, the Court quickly concluded that no
presumption against preemption would operate.316
The Court began by identifying federal objectives: the federal regulatory scheme
empowers the FDA to protect itself from and to deter fraud.317 The Court emphasized the need
for flexibility in enforcing that regulatory scheme given its other “difficult (and often competing)
objectives,” including generally protecting medical care practitioners from unnecessary
interference with the practice of medicine.318 The Court did not mention the FDA’s position on
the preemption issue, central to Medtronic and Geier, but the concurring opinion noted that the
FDA had waffled on the preemptive effect of its regulatory objectives on state fraud-on-the-FDA
claims.319
312Id.
313Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001)
314Id. at 344. For a complete description of the fraud allegations, see Ausness, supra note at ; and Owen, supra note
at 427-28.
315Buckman Co., 531 U.S. at 347-348, n. 2 (“we express no view on whether these claims are subject to express
preemption”).
316Id. at 347-48.
317Id. at 348-349.
318Id. at 349-350.
319Id. at 354, n. 2 (Stevens, J., concurring: “Though the United States in this case appears to take the position that
fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflict with the federal enforcement scheme even when the FDA has publicly concluded
that it was defrauded and taken all the necessary steps to remove a device from the market, that has not always been
its position. As recently as 1994, the United States took the position that state tort law suits alleging fraud in FDA
applications for medical devices do not conflict with federal law where the FDA has ‘subsequently concluded’ that
the device in question never met the appropriate federal requirements and ‘initiated enforcement actions’ against
those responsible.”).
The Court then evaluated the state law interest at stake to determine whether an actual
conflict existed. The tort law deterrent effect could increase burdens on the medical device
industry, potentially discouraging the request for approval of devices that might have beneficial
off-label uses, in contravention of the stated goal of non-interference with medical practice.320
Similarly, the cost that recognizing state law fraud claims would impose on the industry could
create approval delays of valuable devices, agency administrative inefficiency, and delay in the
provision of health care.321 The Court saw no corresponding benefit to the application of state
law because it was not based on a common law duty of care, but rather on a federal regulation.322
The Court noted, however, that a traditional state tort action might survive.323
E. Last Words on Implied Preemption Doctrine: Of Sprietsma and Bates
The Court’s next two preemption opinions, Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine324 and Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences LLC,325 provide additional insight into the Court’s implied conflict
preemption analysis though both involve express preemption provisions. Both cases address the
importance of agency position on preemption and the value of common law damages actions in
regulating conduct.
Sprietsma involved allegations of design defect against manufacturers of recreational
boats that did not have propeller guards.326 The Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (“FBSA”)327
gave the Secretary of Transportation authority, delegated to the Coast Guard, to establish “a
coordinated national boating safety program” including authority to promulgate safety standards
for boating equipment to establish uniform safety regulations.328 The Coast Guard, after
320Id. at 350.
321Id. at 351.
322Id. at 352-53 (plaintiff not relying on traditional state tort law; existence of federal enactment is critical element of
claim, contrasting Silkwood and Medtronic).
323Id. (“In sum, were plaintiffs to maintain their fraud-on-the-agency claims here, they would not be relying on
traditional state tort law which had predated the federal enactments in question.”).
324Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
325Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S.Ct. 1788 (2005).
326Id. at 55. Plaintiff’s wife had been thrown from a boat and was killed when struck by the propeller blades. Id.
32746 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2000).
328S. Rep. No. 92-248, at 1333-35, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333.
gathering data and holding public hearings over a several year period, decided not to require such
guards for reasons of safety, feasibility and economics.329 Neither did the Coast Guard forbid
the use of such guards.330 In defense of Sprietsma’s claim of design defect, the manufacturer
argued that the Coast Guard’s decision not to require a propeller guard preempted plaintiff’s
claim.331 The FBSA contains both an express preemption provision and a savings clause.332
The Court, consistent with Geier, found no express preemption and engaged in an
implied conflict preemption analysis.333 The Court assessed the strength of the federal and state
governmental policies at stake to determine whether an actual conflict was presented. The Court
noted that the emphasis of Coast Guard regulations has been to preserve state authority pending
the adoption of specific federal regulations.334 The Coast Guard’s position on preemption,
therefore, was in favor of permitting state common law claims.335 While the Court noted that a
federal agency decision not to regulate might have preemptive force, the Court found no such
force in this case because of the more prominent safety objectives motivating the Coast Guard’s
decision.336
The Court’s most recent preemption decision involved express preemption principles but
the Court made some important, general observations about the delicate balance that must be
achieved in determining the scope of preemption. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,337 involved
whether common law tort actions challenging the labeling of defendant’s pesticide were
329Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 58. The Coast Guard referred the study to the National Boating Safety Advisory Council,
as required under the statute. 46 U.S.C. §§4302 (c)(4) (2000). The Advisory Council’s 1990 recommendation stated
that the data did not support the adoption of a regulation requiring propeller guards, but it would continue to monitor
the issue for additional information on the state of the design art. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 59 (quoting 1990 letter to
the Advisory Council).
330Id.
331Id. at 55.
332Id. at 55-56.
333Id. at 63-64.
334Id.
335Id. at 65-66. The Court emphasized the Government’s consistent position that the regulation did not have any pre-
emptive effect. Id. at 66.
336Id. at 69-70. Finally, the general federal interest in uniformity was an insufficient objective, without more, to
create a conflict. Id. at 70.
337Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005).
preempted under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).338 The lower
courts had found express preemption of all claims based on a statutory provision forbidding
states from imposing requirements for labeling “in addition to or different from” those required
under FIFRA.339 The lower courts reasoned that a jury finding under state law would induce the
defendant to alter its pesticide labeling which the Environmental Protection Agency had
approved (EPA).340 The EPA had taken inconsistent positions on preemption within the previous
five years, first in favor of the operation of state tort law, as proposed in an amicus brief
submitted in a prior case341 and then in favor of preemption as proposed in an amicus brief
submitted in Bates.342
The Court’s discussion of the history of FIFRA regulation reads much like the history of
FDCA regulation. For example, the Court notes that “Prior to 1910, the States provided the
primary and possibly the exclusive source of regulatory control over the distribution of poisonous
substances.”343 The history of the FDCA regarding drugs is virtually identical.344 In addition,
FIFRA imposes misbranding liability for labels that are false or misleading in any particular,345
just as the FDCA does for prescription drugs and devices. The addition to FIFRA in 1972 of an
express preemption provision which governs the continuing role of the states in pesticide
regulation is the primary difference between the two statutory schemes.346 In addition, the EPA
does not determine or endorse the efficacy of pesticides it approves for marketing,347 unlike the
FDA’s drug approvals which do review the efficacy claims in drug applications.348
The Court noted that tort litigation has been ongoing for decades against pesticide
manufacturers, both before and after the enactment of FIFRA in 1947, and that it was not until
after Cipollone in 1992 that a “groundswell” of preemption arguments based on FIFRA
338Id.
339Id. at 1796.
340Id. at 1793-94 (emphasis supplied).
341Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Service, Inc., 993 P. 2d 366 (2000) (Brief Amicus Curiae for Unites States).
342125 S. Ct. at 1794, fn. 7.
343Id. at 1794.
344 See supra notes and accompanying text.
345Id. at 1795.
346Id. at 1795-96.
347Id. at 1796.
348 See supra notes and accompanying text.
preemption were advanced.349 The FIFRA regulatory scheme incorporates a significant role for
the states, but the express preemption provision required the Court to determine its scope
nevertheless. The Court found no preemption of most claims but remanded for further inquiry
regarding the labeling claims.350
The Court rejected the claim, relied on by the lower courts, that simply because a jury
verdict might have an effect on a manufacturer, that the damages action was therefore preempted
because it might induce a labeling change.351 “A requirement is a rule of law that must be
obeyed; an event, such as a jury verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is not a
requirement.”352 Consequently, state law requirements that are “equivalent to or consistent with”
FIFRA regulations survived.353 Parallel requirements imposed on manufacturers under state and
federal law will provide an additional cause to comply with the federal requirements.354
The Court took a dim view of expansively reading Congress’ intent to preempt given “the
long history of tort litigation against manufacturers of poisonous substances” which “adds force
to the basic presumption against pre-emption.”355 The Court reiterated that if Congress had
intended to prevent the operation of “a long available form of compensation,” it surely would
have expressed that intent more clearly.356 Further, “private remedies that enforce federal
misbranding requirements would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA. . . .
FIFRA contemplates that pesticide labels will evolve over time, as manufacturers gain more
information about their products’ performance in diverse settings,”357 noting that tort suits can
act “as a catalyst” in this effort.358 The Court’s discussion in Bates of the benefit of tort suits in
349Id. at 1796-97.
350Id. at 1803-04.
351Id. at 1799.
352Id. “The inducement test is unquestionably overbroad . . . “ Id.
353Id. at 1800.
354Id. at 1801. The Court rejected the notion that FIFRA contained a “nonambiguous command to pre-empt” given
that the EPA had just five years earlier advocated the position against preemption that the Court adopted. Id.
355Id. at 1802.
356Id.
357Id.
358Id.
warning cases and the value of those tort actions historically in regulating warnings may serve as
an important bridge to the implied preemption issue under the FDCA.359
F. Synthesis of Preemption Doctrine
Building on the analysis of the Court’s recent preemption opinions, a number of
principles inform how the Court is likely to treat implied preemption regarding prescription drug
labeling. The presumption against preemption maintains vitality in cases involving traditional
areas of historic state power, as seen in Bates and Medtronic and confirmed in Buckman Co.,360
and is likely to be especially forceful in implied conflict preemption under the FDCA. Even
though Geier did not mention it specifically, the Court was certainly sensitive to the role that tort
actions play in motivating conduct and specifically left open the possibility that tort actions in
some cases, even under the standard there in issue, might survive if narrowly drawn.361 Bates
discussion of the long-standing role of tort litigation both before and under FIFRA reiterate the
important role of the state’s in regulating public health and safety, particularly where the giving
of important safety information through product labeling and literature is concerned, as is the
case under the FDA with prescription drug labeling.
Determining whether an actual conflict exists will involve an assessment of the federal
objectives at stake, as identified through the legislation, its history, and the agency’s views on the
scope of the regulatory scheme, as evidenced particularly by Geier, Buckman Co., Sprietsma,
and, to a lesser extent, Bates.362 The position of the relevant government agency on the
preemptive effect of the regulations and the consistency of that position over time are related to
those regulatory objectives and are important in their assessment, though it remain unclear just
how important the agency’s position will be. As early as Hillsborough County, the importance to
the Court of the FDA’s position on preemption, and whether that position has been consistently
held, is evident.363
While federal regulatory action reflects a balancing of objectives with methods that will
properly implement those objective, the importance of maintaining a particular balance has
359 For a discussion of the effect of Bates on prescription drug labeling preemption, see OWEN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, supra note at § 14:3 (2d ed. forthcoming 2008).
360See supra notes and accompanying text. The presumption against preemption has also surfaced as “an assumption
of non-preemption” that is not triggered in areas of significant federal presence. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89,
108 (2000)(involving preemption of state policies regarding Burma; foreign affairs exclusively federal; preemption
found).
361 See supra notes and accompanying text.
362See supra notes and accompanying text.
363See supra notes and accompanying text (discussing importance of absence of agency position in Hillsborough
County).
tipped the scales in favor of implied conflict preemption, as was the case in Geier but not in
Sprietsma or Bates. Whether state tort claims actually conflict or whether they operate in a
complementary way with the prescription drug labeling scheme will require close attention to the
details of the regulatory scheme. Do such claims fall within the boundaries of federal regulation
or outside them?
V. NEGOTIATING THE BATTLEFIELD OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG LABELING
PREEMPTION
This section applies the previous analysis of implied preemption doctrine to the
prescription drug labeling context. The FDA’s arguments in favor of implied conflict
preemption are reiterated, and then the Supreme Court’s implied conflict preemption doctrine is
applied to those arguments. Finally, insights gleaned from the Court’s broader preemption
doctrine aid in the final analysis and require the ultimate conclusion that the FDA’s preemption
arguments are unlikely to prevail.
A. The Arguments for Implied Conflict Preemption
Fundamentally, the FDA and manufacturers who support preemption must define an
actual conflict between state law and federal objectives that requires the conclusion that those
federal objectives will be frustrated by the concurrent operation of state tort laws. The Court has
rejected imposing any “special burden” on proponents of conflict preemption;364 rather, the Court
has stated, in various ways, that the presumption against preemption in the area of traditional
state regulation of health and safety require a clear conflict, even one requiring “strong evidence”
to support it.
The FDA has articulated three objectives that it considers impacted by the operation of
state tort laws because of the sensitive balance that its labeling regulations achieve. First, the
FDA asserts that permitting jury verdicts based on approved labeling will impact that balance by
encouraging manufacturers to warn physicians of unsubstantiated risks and thereby make
inappropriate medical treatment decisions.365 This potential over-warning of risks may also deter
the use of an otherwise beneficial drug in circumstances when it is advised. The concern of over-
warning is connected to the general concern that manufacturers will be motivated to alter
warning labels without substantiation and therefore impact medical treatment provided by
physicians.
Second, the FDA considers its labeling regulations to achieve, in some cases, more than a
minimum standard. The FDA now considers those regulations, in most cases, to be optimal, or
ceiling, standards from which deviation is neither required nor permitted absent specific FDA
364 See supra notes and accompanying text (discussing Geier and rejection of special burden notion).
365 See supra notes and accompanying text.
approval.366 The FDA also notes the further specific concern that, in some instances, a
manufacturer will be subject to a misbranding allegation if it satisfies a state common law
damages action and alters a label that subsequently does not meet with FDA approval.
The Zoloft experience, as documented in Motus v. Pfizer, Inc.,367 well illustrates the
arguments being made for implied conflict preemption and, indeed, may be the poster child for
such preemption. The FDA studied the alleged association between SSRI anti-depressants and
the risk of suicide on a number of separate occasions, both before and during the approval
process for Zoloft.368 Zoloft was first approved in 1991 and subsequently approved for four
additional medical conditions.369 During those subsequent approvals, the FDA determined on
each occasion that a stronger warning of the causal connection between use of SSRIs and the risk
of suicide was not necessary.370 The FDA never prohibited Pfizer or other SSRI manufacturers
from altering the labeling, however,371 though the common practice is for manufacturers not to
alter labels without prior FDA approval. Based on its conclusions, the FDA argued in Motus that
a common law damages action based on the alleged inadequacy of the warning of the risk of
suicide would directly conflict with the FDA regulations because any label other than the one
approved by the FDA would be misleading and, therefore, would constitute misbranding under
the FDCA.372
The FDA asserted more generally that, given its objective “to ensure each drug’s optimal
use through requiring scientifically substantiated warnings,” a common law tort action would
frustrate those purposes.373 The FDA expressed concern for the potential “under-utilization of a
drug based on dissemination of scientifically unsubstantiated warnings, so as to deprive patients
of beneficial, possibly lifesaving treatment.”374 According to the FDA, a common law tort action
366 See supra notes and accompanying text.
367Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1088 (C. D. Cal. 2000) (background information on Zoloft), rev’d on
other grounds, 358 F. 3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004).
368127 F.Supp. 2d at 1089-1090.
369Id. at 1089.
370Id. at 1090; see also Motus Amicus Brief of United States, supra note at 13.
371Motus, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1093-94.
372Motus Amicus Brief of United States, supra note at 15-17. In addition, the FDA posited that even though
manufacturers are permitted to alter warnings before FDA approval, the FDA must ultimately approve an altered
label, which, if found to be misleading, would not be approved. Id. at 17. The brief stated, somewhat self-servingly,
that the FDA would have disapproved an altered Zoloft label. Id. at 18.
373Id. at 23.
374Id.
might encourage the use of a warning that would diminish the impact of valid warnings,
“creating an unnecessary distraction.”375
Each of these concerns, over-warning resulting in under-utilization of an effective drug,
dilution of otherwise valid warnings from over-warning, and the potential misbranding violations
that may result, are the federal objectives identified in the new labeling regulation.376 The next
sub-section analyzes how these objectives will fare under the Court’s implied conflict
preemption principles when compared to the state tort principles with which they are alleged to
conflict.
B. Application of Implied Conflict Preemption
Based on preemption doctrine as it has evolved both under the FDCA and generally, the
circumstances of prescription drug labeling raise the following issues to be resolved. First, how
are the federal objectives to be defined in the case of prescription drug labeling with which state
tort laws arguable conflict? This inquiry requires a careful assessment of the agency’s position
over time with sensitivity to the history of those objectives. The debate over whether FDA
regulations set minimum or maximum standards is central to this inquiry. Second, what effect
does the historic presumption that state regulation in the field of public health and safety is not
preempted have in the assessment of those objectives? The Court has been hesitant to permit an
overly aggressive assessment of federal objectives to swamp the importance of state regulation,
particularly in the area of longstanding traditional tort principles. Third, does the indirect
regulatory effect of common law damages actions create an actual, direct conflict with the
objectives of the prescription drug labeling regulatory regime? Subsumed in this third question
is the debate over the effect of the FDA’s recently altered position on preemption.
1. Federal Objectives of the Prescription Drug Labeling Regulations
As early as Savage v. Jones377 and McDermott v. Wilson,378 the objective of the food and
drug laws has been clear: to protect the public health and safety from adulterated and misbranded
drugs.379 The FDA, as the undisputed expert federal public health agency charged with insuring
the safety and efficacy of the nation’s drug supply,380 must be permitted to satisfy its public
375Id. at 23-24.
37671 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934-3935 (January 24, 2006). See also supra notes and accompanying text.
377Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
378McDermott v. Wilson, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
379See supra notes and accompanying text.
38071 Fed. Reg. at 3934.
health mission substantially unimpeded. The federal objectives of public safety, however, are not
inconsistent with the historic primacy of the states in the field of public health and safety.
Because Congress has not expressed its intent to preempt state regulation, even though it is
capable of doing just that, the states have continued to be free to fulfill their historic and primary
regulatory role.381
Had Congress desired to alter that balance it could have enacted a general FDCA
preemption provision, or one directed toward prescription drug labeling, but it has not. On a
number of occasions in the federal food and dug laws, beginning with the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976,382 Congress has written such express preemption provisions. That it has
not done so in the case of prescription drug labeling suggests, at the least, that it is aware of the
current regulatory status quo and is content to leave it alone, including permitting its authorized
agency to address the matter. Even though congressional intent is not directly in issue, the fact
that Congress has not defined a specific preemptive scope in this area suggests that federal
objectives to be considered in determining the implied preemptive scope of authorized
regulations should be carefully circumscribed. Such was the case in Geier in which the Court
was influenced by the particularized federal objectives which supported finding an actual conflict
between the specific “variety and mix” of passive restraint systems required and tort actions
based on a different manufacturer choice. The “long history of tort litigation”383 in the
prescription drug labeling area, and the oft-repeated view that Congress would not defeat the
operation of “a long available form of compensation” without making its intent to do so clear384
support the requirement of clear, particularized federal objectives to which implied conflict
preemption principles are applied in the prescription drug labeling context.385
As in Hillsborough County, those seeking to preempt state health and safety regulations,
therefore, have an “uphill battle.”386 “Strong evidence” is needed to defeat the presumption that
state health laws are not preempted,387 either in their entirety, through a federal occupation of the
381Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718 (1985). See also Caraker
v.Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1035-1036 (S.D. Ill. 2001)(discussing FDA preemption position
history).
38221 U.S.C. § 360k (2000). See also supra notes and accompanying text.
383Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1802 (2005)
384Id. at 1802. See also supra notes and accompanying text.
385See, e.g., Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726 (D. Minn. 2005); Caraker v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 172 F.
Supp.2d 1018, 1031-43 (S. D. Ill. 2001).
386Hillborough County, 471 U.S. at 714.
387Id. at 719.
field388 or through actual conflict. When implied conflict preemption is in issue, therefore,
federal objectives must be defined on a narrow, particularized basis389 as a way of insuring that
an unnecessarily broad definition is not used to usurp state regulation where Congress has not
expressed its intent to do so. The Court, therefore, has been restrictive in its definition of what
constitutes an “actual, direct” conflict with federal objectives.390 General observations about the
possible negative implications of common law tort actions on the regulatory scheme should be
met with skepticism.
The FDA’s stated objective to prevent over-warning sounds like the kind of general
objective that is unpersuasive under this standard. Concerns about over-warning are often made
by manufacturers in the products liability field because of the generalized concern that juries too
easily require warnings based on the hindsight that a particular warning, not given, should have
been, putting manufacturers in the position of having to warn about everything. Prescription
drug labeling is directed at a very sophisticated physician audience. The over-warning concern is
quite different when raised with a learned intermediary, and one that the FDA only substantiates
with very general statements and no data supporting the concern. When offered the choice to
have information in the new labeling regulation highlighted and emphasized, physicians
uniformly greeted the new format with approval because they wanted more information, and not
less.391
It is hard to understand why having less information about the possible risks of a drug
treatment would benefit a patient’s medical care rather than more. A physician who might be
inclined to withhold a particular drug treatment because of disclosed risks may do so for an
infinite variety of reasons related to the individual patient’s medical needs, only one of which
may be sensitivity to “over-warning.” The potential harm, of course, from a lack of information
388See Motus Amicus Brief for United States, supra note at 19-20 (recognizing that some state required labeling
would be permissible and thus eschewing occupation of the field preemption).
See also Hillsborough County, Fla., 471 U.S. at 717 (“We are even more reluctant to infer pre-emption
from the comprehensiveness of regulations than from the comprehensiveness of statutes. As a result of their
specialized functions, agencies normally deal with problems in far more detail than does Congress. To infer pre-
emption whenever an agency deals with a problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying that whenever
a federal agency decides to step into a field, its regulations will be exclusive. Such a rule, of course, would be
inconsistent with the federal-state balance embodied in our Supremacy Clause jurisprudence.”).
389See Hillsborough County, Fla. 471 U.S. at 720-21 (defining federal goal narrowly in assess actual conflict
preemption).
390See supra notes and accompanying text for a discussion of actual conflict as assessed in Hillsborough County, Fla.
v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707 (1985), Geier v. American Honda Motor Corp., and Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm.,
391 See supra notes and accompanying text.
about those risks, which can be explained in the exacting scientific detail with which all
prescription drug labels are written, should not be overstated.
The generalized objectives the FDA has articulated do not have the level of historic, long-
standing support which supported the “variety and mix” of objectives that were present in Geier.
The regulatory objectives in Geier applied to a particular design features for all automobiles
manufactured in the United States, not just one automobile model. Further, the design
requirement, involving significant technical detail in automobile engineering, permitted a choice
of designs to achieve a deliberate balance in the automobile fleet over time as the ultimate goal,
air bags in all vehicles, could be achieved. By contrast, the prescription drug labeling preemption
argument relates to certain prescription drugs whose manufacturers have information about risk,
discovered post-approval, which could be disclosed, indeed may have to be disclosed according
to the statutory scheme, but which they do not wish to disclose. Like Bates, in which the
manufacturer had a continuing obligation to assure its label was not misleading, an agency’s
approval of warning language, that may be subsequently and unilaterally altered, does not rise to
the level of firm regulatory objectives as found in Geier that might support a direct conflict with
state tort litigation. To substantiate the decision to withhold risk information from well-
educated, sophisticated physicians requires a better explanation under the Court’s implied
preemption cases than the generalized concern of over-warning currently articulated.
2. Historic State Regulation and the Presumption Against Preemption
The traditional role of the states in regulating food and drug safety, coupled with the
historic recognition of the value of common law damages actions in that effort, will weigh
heavily in the determination of whether state law directly and actually conflicts with federal
objectives in the field. As early as Savage v. Jones and as recently as Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
LLC, the Court has acknowledged the importance of state law, including state tort litigation, in
providing a remedial component of the regulatory scheme as well as serving as a catalyst in aid
of the federal regulatory effort.392
The Court has struggled with whether the presumption against preemption of state police
powers regulation is relevant in express preemption analysis because congressional intent to
preempt is directly in issue,393 but clearly returned to an emphasis on that presumption in
Bates.394 The use of the presumption against preemption in the implied preemption context is
different contextually because congressional intent is not specifically in issue but, rather, the
presumption against preemption is critical in determining whether an actual conflict is present.
392 See supra notes and accompanying text (discussion of Savage v. Jones and Bates v Dow Agrosciences).
393See supra notes and accompanying text.
394 See supra notes and accompanying text.
For example, in Hillsborough County, the Court considered the presumption against
preemption to apply strongly and defeat implied field preemption.395 Regarding conflict
preemption, the Court was less concerned with the presumption because it found no evidence of
an actual conflict to begin with because the stated federal objectives were too speculative to be
credited.396 Had the agency’s position been made clearer, the Court would then have had to
assess the value of the presumption against preemption in defining whether an actual conflict
existed.
The Court did not mention the presumption at all when discussing implied conflict
preemption in Geier, though it was certainly interested in the importance of state tort law as an
important mechanism to address health and safety concerns regarding automobile passive
restraint design.397 Geier was sensitive to the need for tort law compensation and its regulatory
effect and, in a very close call, exalted the federal objectives because of their specificity,
comprehensiveness, and the background historic societal debate that passenger restraint
regulation involved. In Buckman Co., the Court rejected the notion that a presumption operated
in the facts of that case because the subject of regulation, policing fraud on the FDA, was not an
area historically within the state’s police power. The Court noted, however, that it might treat a
traditional state tort action differently.398
One is left with some uncertainty as to the importance of the presumption against
preemption as such. It is clear, however, that in assessing whether an actual conflict exists, the
Court openly considers the importance of traditional state regulation in the particular subject area
as a strong counter weight to the stated federal objectives in the balance. For example, in
Sprietsma, the Court rejected a finding of implied conflict preemption when a federal agency had
decided not to regulate precisely because state tort actions had traditionally operated as a means
of increasing incentives toward safety.399 The Court refused to permit an expert agency
assessment to have greater effect than necessary. Arguably, an FDA decision not to require a
particular warning in prescription drug labeling is, in effect, a decision not to regulate and should
be treated in a similar fashion.
Similarly, the Court was openly hostile toward the proposed rejection of “longstanding”
principles of tort compensation in Bates400 involving pesticide labeling under FIFRA. The Court
395See supra notes and accompanying text.
396Id.
397See supra notes and accompanying text.
398Id.
399See supra notes and accompanying text.
400See supra notes and accompanying text.
confirmed its dedication to the presumption against preemption in assessing Congress’ intent and
noted that “private remedies . . . would seem to aid, rather than hinder” the functioning of a
public health and safety regulatory scheme.401 Bates involved a labeling approval regime of
fewer rigors than the FDA’s but the regime in Bates also involved an express preemption
provision which the Court was called upon to interpret. The concerns for the operation of
traditional state tort principles expressed in Bates would seem to apply, a fortiori, more
persuasively in the case of implied conflict preemption under the FDCA.
The stated federal objectives behind the prescription drug labeling regulation do not
actually conflict with state common law tort actions. The main general objective, protection of
the public health, is not in conflict with state tort actions but operates in a complementary way
with them, and has traditionally. The addition of a remedial scheme based on long-standing state
tort litigation “would seem to aid, rather than hinder” the functioning of a regulatory scheme
based on warning misbranding claims, as the court found in Bates.402 There is no reason, other
than the FDA’s changed position on preemption, to now treat common law tort actions
differently than in the traditional way.
3. Effect of the FDA’s change in position on preemption
The FDA argues that because labeling approval is solely within the FDA’s authority, state
common law tort actions may interfere with the balancing of risks that under gird that approval.
The concern of over-warning and the possible disincentive created to physicians to prescribe an
otherwise appropriate drug are at the core of this argument.
The FDA’s authority to approve prescription drug labeling has not changed; its desire to
use preemption based on that approval authority is all that has changed. The Court’s implied
conflict preemption doctrine rejects such a change as insignificant in itself to support preemption.
The FDA’s change in position regarding preemption is too recent and too tied to specific
litigation to constitute the kind of formal, long standing agency position which has been credited
as relevant to assessing conflict preemption. In neither Sprietsma, Bates, nor Easterwood was
such a change in agency position credited.403 Bates and Easterwood involved express
preemption provisions as to which greater deference to agency interpretations might have been
appropriate; nevertheless, the Court refused to credit it.404
In Medtronic, the plurality opinion was “substantially informed” by the FDA’s position
on preemption because Congress had expressly provided authority to the FDA to determine when
401Id.
402 Bates, 544 U.S. at 451. See supra notes and accompanying text.
403See supra notes and accompanying text.
404See supra notes and accompanying text.
state regulations would be preempted under the MDA.405 The Court did not acknowledge that it
was required to give any level of deference to the FDA’s interpretation of its preemption
authority; Justice O’Connor in dissent noted uncertainty as to whether any deference was
required in such circumstances.406 In contrast to Medtronic, there is no formal preemption
provision in the new prescription drug labeling regulation. There is only commentary in the
preamble. There has been no comment from the health care community at large, either
physicians or their organizations, or state public health officials, or industry representatives for
that matter, on the FDA’s formal position in favor of preemption. The proposed regulation
specifically disclaimed any intent to alter the FDA’s formal position on preemption, and, rather,
simply asked for comments on the product liability implications of the proposed labeling
regulation itself.407 The new preemption position is merely a re-articulation of the FDA’s recent
litigation positions in a few amicus briefs. Describing the new position as a longstanding, formal
regulatory policy is a misnomer that the Court’s implied conflict preemption doctrine will see
through.
An agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is ordinarily accorded great
deference.408 The degree of that deference has been the subject of much discussion in the Court’s
preemption opinions, including the opinions involving the FDA.409 Generally, though, the
degree of deference due to government positions depends on, among other things, consistency,
formality, and thoroughness.410 Briefs are not accorded great policy deference,411 particularly
when the FDA interprets statutes or regulations in a particular case, “at such a time and in such a
405See supra notes and accompanying text.
406Id. (Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 512).
40765 Fed. Reg. at 81103 (December 22, 2000) (“[T]his proposed rule does not preempt State law.”) See also
supra notes and accompanying text
408See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As to
deference accorded FDA determinations, see generally O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. 2D, supra note at § 4:12.
For additional discussion of the deference issue, see Mark C. Levy and Gregory J. Wartman, Amicus Curiae Efforts
to Reform Product Liability at the Food and Drug Administration: FDA’s Influence on Federal Preemption of Class
III Medical Devices and Pharmaceuticals, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 495 (2005);.Allison M. Zieve and Brian Wolfman,
The FDA’s Argument for Eradicating State Tort Law: Why it is Wrong and Warrants No Deference, 34 Prod. Saf. &
Liab. Rptr. (BNA) at 308 (March 27, 2006).
409See supra notes and accompanying text (discussing Hillsborough County, Medtronic, and Buckman Co.).
410United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). See also Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 277. F. Supp. 2d 725,
730 (D. Minn. 2005) (Motus amicus brief of United States in prior Zoloft warning case not given deference; reason
to suspect that brief’s interpretation does not reflect “fair and considered judgment” of agency on issue).
411Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d. 726, 730 (D. Minn. 2005) National Pharmaceutical Alliance v. Henney,
47 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D. D. C. 1999). See generally O’Reilly, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. 2D, supra note at § 4:12.
manner so as to provide a convenient litigating position” for a particular action.412 Its efforts to
obtain greater deference in the MDA context have met with limited success413 precisely because
the FDA is interpreting its own regulation on preemption but even the change in FDA position in
the MDA context is being met with significant skepticism.414 Similarly, in Bates, the EPA
changed its position on preemption within a few years, based on its interpretation of an express
preemption provision, and the Court found those arguments “particularly dubious” because the
agency reversed a longstanding no-preemption interpretation.415
While the Court has rejected an absolute requirement of notice-and-comment rule-making
to give “some weight” to an agency position on preemption, the consistency and thoroughness of
the preemption position is critical before it is persuasive. The FDA’s historical position in favor
of the concurrent operation of traditional state tort claims is a significant barrier to recognition of
its current preemption position as consistent with federal objectives. The Court has looked with
disfavor on changed agency position, particularly for litigation purposes, as support for conflict
preemption. Only in Geier in which the Court found implied conflict preemption, was agency
position persuasive and that was based on the Secretary of Transportation’s unwavering position
on the importance of the federal objectives in issue.416 In the railroad safety regulation cases,417
the agency’s change in preemption position was rejected as inconsistent with the statutory
scheme and, thus, of no effect in the express preemption analysis. Bates also rejected the change
in agency position on preemption as persuasive. While agency position is given some deference,
in the case of implied conflict preemption of traditional state tort actions, consistency of position
is more important than recency of position in assessing actual conflict.
4. Establishing Direct Conflict: The Dynamic Nature of Risk Information and
Minimum Standards
Finally, in assessing whether an actual, direct conflict exists to support implied
preemption, the proponent of preemption must support the conflict with particularized evidence
of conflict, as in Hillsborough County.418 The Court is unpersuaded by speculation or
hyperbole. In the prescription drug labeling context, the dynamic nature of the scientific
understanding of risk and the way that risk is discovered and appreciated by manufacturers,
412See O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. 2D, supra note at § 4:12.
413Horn v. Thoratec, Inc., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004); Riegel v. Medtronic ___ F.3d ___ , 2006 WL 1328835 (2d
Cir. 2006)
414 See Ausness, supra note at 767.
415 Bates, 544 U.S. at 449.
416See supra notes and accompanying text.
417See supra notes and accompanying text.
418 See supra notes and accompanying text.
regulators and physicians disfavors preemption. In Bates involving labeling of pesticides, the
Court refused to give broad scope to the preemption provision in issue because doing so would
stifle an otherwise dynamic need to continually evaluate risks about which warnings should be
provided.419 Inertia is a powerful force: if preemption exists based on labeling choices, why
would any manufacturer ever suggest a warning change? The onus would be on the FDA to
police the scientific advances regarding each prescription drug it has approved and then propose
warning label changes where necessary. Such an obligation is inconsistent with the statutory and
regulatory scheme and with the FDA’s limited resources to regulate a large number of
prescription drug manufacturers.
Indeed, many commentators, and more recently the Government Accountability Office,420
have criticized the FDA’s inability to obtain full information from prescription drug
manufacturers because the reporting process for post-approval adverse reaction events and
clinical trials is too weak. The FDA does not have authority to require additional clinical trials
after drug approval. Consequently, many have argued that the tort litigation system acts as an
important avenue by which the health care community learns of safety and efficacy
information.421
One example will illustrate the weakness of the FDA regulatory system that will weigh
against preemption. Merck & Co. received approval from the FDA to market its anti-
inflammatory drug Vioxx for use in treating arthritis pain in February 1999.422 In June 2000,
Merck submitted data to the FDA disclosing a four-fold higher risk of heart attacks compared to
another pain-reliever, but not until April 2002 did the FDA approve a new warning that referred
to an increase in cardiovascular risks.423 Merck voluntarily recalled Vioxx from the market in
September 2004 because results of a clinical trial indicated a doubled risk of cardiac events in
those who used Vioxx.424 After Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market in October 2004,
Congress held hearings on the FDA’s alleged regulatory failure to require additional warnings
419 See supra notes and accompanying text.
420 See supra notes and accompanying text.
421Gary Young, FDA Strategy Would Preempt Tort Suits: Does it Close off Vital Drug Data?, NATIONAL L. J., col 1,
(March 1, 2004); Joe Pickett, Pressure Building for FDA to Mandate Post-Approval Studies after Vioxx Incident,
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sooner.425 The FDA spokesman stated the FDA needed more regulatory authority to add warning
labels after safety concerns surface after a drug is approved. The Vioxx warning label change
was delayed for one year while the FDA and Merck negotiated over it.
While the current practice may be that manufacturers wait for FDA approval before
making labeling changes, that practice does not, nor should it, prevent manufacturers from acting
on risk information. The statute imposes on such manufacturers a greater obligation for the
public safety. Tolerating, or ignoring, a failure to fulfill that obligation is inconsistent with the
statutory mandate. The FDA may tolerate the practice of permitting manufacturers to wait until a
labeling change is approved, but permitting common law tort actions to operate concurrently
does not conflict with either the statutory or regulatory mandate that requires more.426 Tort
liability might increase the likelihood that manufacturers will seek FDA approval of a labeling
change, pursuant to the obligation to add significant risk information unilaterally, based on
evidence that is only available to it, and, perhaps, only likely to be disclosed through the
litigation process.
Preemption based on an FDA approved label will create a disincentive to act promptly
based on acquired evidence of risk. Adverse side effects and evidence of increased risk come to
drug manufacturers in a wide variety of ways.427 The FDA approves labels based on a variety of
such information submitted to it by manufacturers.428 The FDA relies on manufacturers to
provide the information required under its regulations.429 The FDA is not an investigative
agency; it is a regulatory agency. It, like other regulatory agencies, receives information from
members of the industry it regulates and acts on that information. It does not actively seek out
information to accomplish these goals unless information is brought to it highlighting a need to
do so, and it does not have the authority to require manufacturers to engage in clinical trials or
report all adverse reactions to obtain that information.430
In the case of Zoloft, citizen petitions were presented to the FDA on three occasions
seeking to convince the FDA to require an enhanced label regarding the risk of suicidality.431
The FDA refused to require such a label until 2004 when it issued a public health advisory to that
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effect. The FDA asked manufacturers for information about pediatric studies on other anti-
depressants and ultimately acknowledged that additional data and analysis were needed,
including increased public discussion. This information was slow to materialize and were it not
for the actions of non-manufacturers, it might never have. If preemption was permitted, and no
common law tort action had been available to bring some of this information to light, the
warning might not yet be provided. The incentives provided by the tort system are a necessary
complement to the federal objectives of public safety and not an impediment to them.
The FDA’s final argument that its regulations are optimal, not minimum, standards is
inconsistent with the regulatory scheme it administers. Given that manufacturers may
unilaterally alter warnings when substantial risk information comes to them, coupled with the
FDA’s inability to require stronger warnings absent the regulated manufacturers coming forward
with such information of need substantially undercuts any argument that the labeling regulation
was intended to provide a maximum standard of care. The FDA’s regulatory scheme is quite
unlike the air bag regulation in Geier which specifically permitted alternative design choices to
the industry for specific means-related objectives that had been the subject of lengthy study and
compromise with full information of risk.432 In the case of prescription drug labeling, there is
unlikely ever to be full information of risk on which to base the conclusion that any labeling
should be considered a maximum, or optimal, one.
The FDA argues that its concern for over-warning supports implied conflict preemption
of any common law tort claim that would require a specific warning that the FDA has evaluated
and not required. Government agencies typically argue for preemption based on generally
applicable regulatory decisions, such as the air bag regulation in Geier or the propeller guard
regulation in Sprietsma. It is unusual for a federal agency to argue for preemption based on an
isolated decision that affects one regulated industry member. In Bates, the defendant Dow
Agrosciences LLC argued for preemption based on its specific label that the EPA had permitted,
but the Court found that common law tort actions based on that label’s inadequacies could
proceed if the state requirements were parallel to those imposed under federal law, consistent
with the express preemption provision in issue.433 To argue for preemption based on the labeling
required for a particular prescription drug would extend implied conflict preemption to any
particularized federal government decision that might be made.
Implied conflict preemption based on one manufacturer’s approved drug labeling would
be an expansive application of the Court’s conflict preemption doctrine. It is possible, however,
that under the proposed new labeling regulation, such a result might ensue as it applies to new or
recently approved products. The labeling regulation more narrowly defines those circumstances
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in which manufacturers may unilaterally alter a warning.434 In such a case, FDA approval of a
specific label might be considered to reflect the specific balance of risk and benefit regarding the
label’s content that supports implied conflict preemption. The new, more specific, labeling
regulation which makes it more difficult to change a label could constitute the specific balance
between an over-warning concern and the desire minimally to interfere with the provision of
medical care. A specifically defined regulatory balance could constitute the kind of specific
federal objective that the Court recognized as preempting state common law tort actions in Geier.
Such a situation may develop with a particular new prescription drug as the new regulation is
implemented.
The FDA’s position on preemption, applied not retroactively but prospectively, in such
cases might one day be characterized as a consistent agency position on preemption for those
prescription drugs which fall within it. The concern for over-warning balanced against the
concern that FDA regulations not unnecessarily interfere with the provision of medical care
might constitute the narrow means-related objectives that would support implied conflict
preemption of state common law tort claims. That day has not arrived, however, regarding those
prescription drugs which are regulated under the FDA’s long-standing position against
preemption.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FDA’s new labeling regulation makes many significant changes to prescription drug
labeling to enable clearer, more concise prescribing information to come to medical care
providers. But it is clear that no labeling regulation can create the perfect incentive for
manufacturers to seek better and more complete information regarding the adverse side effects of
the prescriptions we take. In a world where United States patients receive proper medical care
from doctors and nurses only 55 percent of the time,435 pharmaceutical companies are in control
of the research conducted on their products pre- and post-marketing,436 pharmaceutical sales
representatives have increasing influence on the drugs that physicians prescribe,437 and the
pharmaceutical industry is the largest lobbying group in the United States,438 the products
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liability litigation system is a critical component to create incentives for greater access to risk
information to insure the public’s health. The Supreme Court’s implied conflict preemption
doctrine as applied to the FDA’s prescription drug labeling regulations supports this conclusion
and weighs state tort litigation strongly in the battle between proponents and opponents of
preemption.
